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The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: An
American Response to Foreign Competition
ComeliusJ. Golden, Jr. *
Charles E.M. Kolb **
On October 8, 1982, President Reagan signed into law the Ex-
port Trading Company Act of 1982 (ETCA).' Designed to create
jobs and to reduce U.S. balance-of-payments deficits by encouraging
new export ventures, ETCA was the product of nearly four years of
congressional consideration. 2 Although the Administration's expec-
tation that this legislation will create at least $11 billion in increased
sales and more than 300,000 new jobs over the next five years may be
overly optimistic, 3 ETCA is nonetheless potentially significant to
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1 Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003
(Title I), 12 U.S.C. §§ 372, 635a-4, 1841, 1843 (Title II), 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (Title III),
15 U.S.C. § 7 (Title IV)).
2 Export trading company legislation was first introduced by Senator Adlai E. Steven-
son in 1978. See notes 43-46 infra and accompanying text. An abridged version of the legisla-
tive history may be found at the following locations: (1) Conference Reports: S. REP. No.
644, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. REP. No. 924, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); (2) Senate
Report: S. REP. No. 27, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); (3) House Reports: H.R. REP. Nos. 629
& 637 (pts. 1 & 2), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); and H.R. REP. No. 686, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1981); (4) Debates: 127 CONG. REc. S3652-72 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981), 128 CONc. REC.
H4624-58 (daily ed. July 27, 1982), and 128 CONG. REc. S13,114-16 & H8341-50 (daily ed.
Oct. 1, 1982); (5) Remarks on Signing S. 734 into Law: 18 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc.
1283 (Oct. 18, 1982).
3 According to one of ETCA's initial sponsors, each one billion dollars of exports lost
means a corresponding loss of some 40,000-50,000 domestic jobs. Hearings on S 1441 Before the
Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetagy Polit of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Afairs, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 9-10 (1981) (testimony of former Senator Adlai E. Steven-
son) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Hearings]. The Commerce Department press release published
simultaneously with the signing of the legislation cited the Department's own study showing
that export trading companies created pursuant to the legislation would increase U.S. exports
by at least 5% over the next five years, resulting in over $11 billion in increased sales and
350,000 new jobs, based on Census Bureau statistics that each one billion dollars in exports
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U.S. and foreign businesses for at least two reasons. First, U.S. busi-
nesses and U.S. banking organizations will enjoy new export oppor-
tunities created by a clarification of applicable antitrust restrictions
and by a relaxation of the general prohibition against banking orga-
nizations participating in the ownership and management of non-
banking commercial ventures. Second, foreign companies and their
counsel will need to understand the applicable legal standards in or-
der to determine under what circumstances a challenge might be
brought against practices contravening ETCA. Although ETCA
may have modified U.S. antitrust standards, foreign competitors of
U.S. export trading companies (ETCs) still may be able to challenge
ETC activities in their own countries by invoking their own domestic
antitrust provisions, and thus will need to understand the nature of
these potential entrants into international markets.
ETCA consists of four titles. Title I provides a series of defini-
tions which, curiously, applies only to that title and to none other.
4
Title II contains banking law amendments permitting greater bank-
ing involvement, including ownership and control, in export trading
companies. Title III sets forth the Commerce Department's certifica-
tion process under which persons engaged in qualifying export activi-
ties can receive antitrust immunity for conduct within the scope of
validly issued certificates of review. Finally, Title IV, the "Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982," makes the Sherman Act
inapplicable to export trading activities unless the conduct in ques-
tion has a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
domestic U.S. markets, import trade, or the export trade of another
U.S. person.
In passing ETCA, Congress was responding to a growing na-
tional perception that by combining their resources to realize econo-
mies of scale, U.S. companies could more effectively sell American
goods and services abroad. Concern over what many perceive to be
excessive or unfair intrusion by foreign producers, particularly the
Japanese, into U.S. markets for items ranging from automobiles to
high-technology goods has prompted lawmakers and businessmen to
seek ways to encourage a positive U.S. response. ETCA presents an
alternative to protectionist approaches characterized by import re-
creates 31,000 jobs. Other factors, such as currency exchange rates, interest rates, and federal
regulations, could also affect the number of jobs created by the legislation.
4 Drafted by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Title I stands by itself although its
definitional provisions initially were intended to be consistent with those appearing in
ETCA's substantive provisions, which were drafted by the Judiciary and Banking
Committees.
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strictions, quotas, more stringent anti-dumping rules, added duties,
direct export subsidies, or similar measures. 5
Although ETCA has been heralded as a boon to free-trade prin-
ciples, it has not been without its critics, even among proponents of
free trade generally. For some, ETCA represents an increased "ex-
port consciousness" of American businessmen coupled with an en-
couragement of export cartelization. To these critics, ETCA only
exacerbates international trade tensions by pitting one set of cartels
against another.6 Other commentators have tended to downplay
ETCA's effect on export activity, citing relative exchange rates, inter-
est rates, and the extent of economic growth generally among the
Western industrialized economies as having a far greater influence on
the prospective volume of U.S. exports.7
The truth no doubt lies somewhere between the claims of
ETCA's proponents and its detractors. This article will examine the
legislation's history as well as its procedures in order to explain what
the act is intended to do, to assess its strengths, weaknesses, and am-
5 See generally Search andDestroy: An In-Depth Look at the Trading Company Legislation, Amer-
ican Banker, Feb. 17, 1983, at 18. The 97th Congress considered a number of bills that would
have affected import restrictions of one form or another. One such measure was the so-called
"domestic content" bill which would have fixed mandatory quotas on the percentage of parts
used in foreign automobiles that must be provided by U.S. manufacturers. While Martin
Feldstein, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, was "very much op-
posed to the domestic content bill," he nonetheless has observed that "temporary movements
away from free trade by the United States may be helpful" in combatting the projected $75
billion foreign trade deficit for 1983. DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) No. 239, at 1
(Dec. 13, 1982). A number of similar measures have been or are expected to be reintroduced
in the 98th Congress, which convened in January 1983.
6 Some critics have viewed ETCA as a neo-protectionist version of the Webb-Pomerene
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976), which provided limited antitrust immunity for certain non-
service-oriented export activities. See notes 8-41 infra and accompanying text. Professor
James A. Rahl opposed an earlier version of ETCA on the ground that it
would encourage American firms not only to form cartels among themselves but to
participate in foreign and international cartels. An agreement between Americans
and foreign firms dividing markets throughout the world except for the U.S. market
would be exempt under this provision. Past experience indicates that a serious risk
would then arise of a secret agreement to include the United States in the market
allocation to round things out.
International Application of US. Antitrust Laws: Hearings on H.R. 2326, H.R. 1618, and H.R. 2459,
Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciag, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (March 26, 1981) (testimony of James A. Rahl).
7 Several leading U.S. money center banks have also expressed reservations about
ETCA's potential effects, ranging from whether the anticipated profit margins of ETCs
would be high enough to attract bank investment to concern over whether a bank-related
ETC might be regarded as unduly competitive with certain of a bank's existing customers.
On the other hand, some major banks have already announced an intention to form ETCs,
and others are considering the possibility of doing so. See DAILY REPORT FOR ExECuTIvES
(BNA) No. 5, at C-1 (Jan. 7, 1983).
[Vol. 58:743]
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
biguities, and to determine whether it is likely to stimulate the U.S.
economy.
I. ETCA's Origins and Purpose
A. ETCA s Unabohshed Predecessor: The Webb-Pomerene Act
Congressional appreciation of the need to stimulate export sales
and to develop foreign markets is by no means a recent phenomenon.
For example, consider the following congressional testimony on the
subject submitted by the Federal Trade Commission:
In seeking business abroad, American manufacturers and producers
must meet aggressive competition from powerful foreign combina-
tions, often international in character. In Germany, England,
France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, Holland, Sweden,
Belgium, Japan, and other countries businessmen are much freer to
cooperate and combine than in the United States. They have de-
veloped numerous comprehensive combinations, often aided by
their governments, which effectually unite their activities both in
domestic and foreign trade. . . . If Americans are to enter the
markets of the world on equal terms with their organized competi-
tors and their organized customers; if they are to expand the foreign
trade of the U.S. as they should; and if our small producers and
manufacturers are to obtain their rightful share of foreign business
on profitable terms they must be free to unite their efforts. 8
This statement, made over 65 years ago, reflects considerations virtu-
ally identical to those that prompted the recent ETC legislation.
U.S. companies engaged in overseas trade today face strong
competition from, among others, foreign government-assisted enter-
prises and multinational, multi-dimensional trading companies such
as Japan's sogo shosha.9 In some markets, U.S. exporters encounter
common trading arrangements such as subsidies or government-
sponsored export policies which reflect both an aggressive posture to
promote export trade and, occasionally, an equally aggressive pos-
ture to impede foreign imports. Massive and growing trade deficits
among major Western countries, including the United States, have
contributed to a growing concern that governments will look for so-
lutions by frustrating their competitors' market opportunities
8 Summary of Federal Trade Commission Report read on the floor of the House of
Representatives by Congressman Webb on June 13, 1917, reprinted in Hearings on Foreign Trade
and the Antitrust Laws Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judict'y, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 248, 250 (1964).
9 For a discussion of the Japanese sogo shosha and other overseas trading companies, see
notes 53-61 infra and accompanying text.
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through tariff and, more commonly, non-tariff barriers, instead of by
bolstering their own exporting performance. 0
The congressional testimony cited above evidenced both fear of
an organized group of competitors who were "much freer" to cooper-
ate and combine than their U.S. counterparts, and concern that
small- and medium-sized U.S. producers and manufacturers needed
a greater ability to unite in order to realize "their rightful share of
foreign business." The legislative response of that era took the form
of the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918,"1 which exempts export trade
associations from the Sherman Act's 12 antitrust prohibitions. Under
this legislation, a "Webb-Pomerene association" was defined as:
[a]n association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in ex-
port trade and actually engaged solely in such export trade, or an
agreement made or act done in the course of export trade by such
association, provided such association, agreement, or act is not in
restraint of trade within the United States, and is not in restraint of
the export trade of any domestic competitor of such
association .... 13
The legislation provided that a Webb-Pomerene association could
not
either in the United States or elsewhere enter into any agreement,
understanding, or conspiracy, or do any act which artificially or
intentionally enhances or depresses prices within the United States
10 For example, in September 1982, the French government announced that France was
facing a $1.7 billion trade deficit. To help reduce the deficit, ihe government imposed a
requirement that all import documents must now be in French. Two years previously, 37% of
such documents were in English and German. This non-tariff barrier presumably will slow
down the pace of imports, at least in the short run.
Similarly, the French government moved to impede the importation of Japanese video
recorders, which it perceived to have captured an excessive share of the French market. Dur-
ing the first half of 1982, some 270,000 recorders were shipped to France. Now, these ma-
chines must enter France only through the customs station at Poitiers, where there are only
four customs officials and no computer.
A similar situation exists in Japan concerning the importation of baseball bats. Without
the appropriate safety marks, baseball bats cannot be sold in Japan. For Japanese manufac-
turers, safety approval usually is given after a simple factory inspection. Foreign producers,
however, must uncrate their products on the docks for individual inspection. See Lehner, US.
Battle to Sell Baseball Bats in Japan Illustrates Difflulty of Opening Market, Wall St. J., Jan. 19,
1983, at 34, col. 3.
The United States government has imposed its own form of non-tariff barrier by asking
Japan to renew for a third year its "voluntary" restrictions on automobile exports to the
United States. See Protectionism Throws Gatt' Free-Trade Band Out of Tune, THE EcONOMIST,
Nov. 13, 1982, at 79, 80.
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976).
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
13 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976).
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of commodities of the class exported by such association, or which
substantially lessens competition within the United States or other-
wise restrains trade therein.'
4
In short, a Webb-Pomerene association was sheltered from antitrust
liability for price fixing and market division so long as it did so in a
foreign market without any effect on U.S. markets, U.S. prices, or
U.S. competitors. One hundred sixty-two Webb-Pomerene associa-
tions were created between 1918 and 1955.15
The Webb-Pomerene Act failed to stimulate the long-term, sus-
tained export development expected. During one relatively brief pe-
riod, from 1930 through 1935, Webb-Pomerene associations
accounted for approximately 19 percent of U.S. exports. In recent
years, that figure has dropped to as low as 1.5 percent in 1976.16 One
reason why Webb-Pomerene associations account for such a small
proportion of U.S. exports may be that the act applies only to the
export of goods and does not include services. During the last two
decades, the U.S. economy has become increasingly service-oriented,
with a far smaller portion of gross national product, attributable to
heavy industry and manufacturing than in earlier decades.' 7 Thus,
14 Id. Oversight responsibility for Webb-Pomerene associations resides with the Federal
Trade Commission. A qualifying association had to
file with the Federal Trade Commission a verified written statement setting forth
the location of its . . . places of business and the names and addresses of all its
officers and of all its stockholders or members, and if a corporation, a copy of its
certificate or. . . bylaws. . . . It shall also furnish to the Commission such infor-
mation as the Commission may require ....
15 U.S.C. § 65 (1976).
15 For a comprehensive history of Webb-Pomerene associations, see Diamond, The Webb-
Pomerene Act and Export Trade Associations, 44 COLUM. L. REv. 805 (1944); Larson, An Economic
Analjsis of the Webb-Pomerene Act, 13 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1970); Simmons, The Webb-Pomerene Act
and Antitrust Poliy, 1963 Wis: L. REV. 426; Note, The Webb-Pomerene Act. Some New Develop-
ments in a Quiescent Histoty, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 341 (1968); Comment, Export Combinations
and the Antitrust Laws.: The Dilemma of the Webb-Pomerene Act, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 654 (1950).
See also J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
§§ 9.35-9.47 (2d ed. 1981); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
(2d ed. 1973); R. AHEARN & W. JACKSON, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON U.S. EXPORT
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE (Congressional
Research Service June 30, 1980).
16 See 1981 Hearings, supra note 3, at 232 (testimony of W. Paul Cooper, Chairman of the
Board, Acme-Cleveland Corp.); R. AHEARN & W. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 4. See also
STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: A
50-YEAR REVIEW 113 (1967), which concluded that the Webb-Pomerene Act played only a
minor role in expanding overall exports during its first 50 years of existence. One witness at
the 1981 Hearings testified that in its present form, the Webb-Pomerene Act could be detri-
mental to certain businesses. 1981 Hearings, supra note 3, at 237-41 (testimony of H. Peter
Guttmann, President, HPG Associates).
17 See note 49 infta and accompanying text.
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the advantages of the Webb-Pomerene Act simply may not have
been available to a substantial and growing sector of the U.S. econ-
omy. Moreover, the Webb-Pomerene Act's antitrust immunity is
often perceived to be either useless or, at best, sufficiently vague as to
make qualifying as a Webb-Pomerene association an uncertain ven-
ture.t 8 Some commentators have alluded to outright hostility to the
Webb-Pomerene Act by antitrust enforcement officials at both the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. I9 Most
joint U.S. export activity is conducted by consortia working outside
the United States which have undoubtedly been counseled as to the
relevant antitrust considerations of their exporting operations.
In 1977, the Department of Justice issued its Antitrust Guidefor
International Operations,20 which concluded that the Webb-Pomerene
Act was unnecessary since the protections it offered were "broadly
consistent" with the basic principles of the Sherman Act when ap-
plied to the transactions of joint export associations.2' The Antitrust
Guide stated that "we do not anticipate that transactions outside the
coverage of the Webb-Pomerene Act will be subject to substantially
different rules under the Sherman Act."122 In other words, conduct
satisfying the Sherman Act's criteria would also satisfy those of the
Webb-Pomerene Act.2 3 This position fails to recognize that the
Webb-Pomerene Act may well express congressional intent that cer-
tain joint export behavior, including collusive extraterritorial re-
18 See 1981 Hearings, supra note 3, at 311-13 (citing SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL Fi-
NANCE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. EXPORT
TRADE POLICY, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1979)). In light of these circumstances, proponents
of a new legislative initiative ultimately decided against amending the Webb-Pomerene Act
and instead elected to draft new legislation to address directly the antitrust uncertainty and
to encourage exports by the nation's growing service industries.
19 1981 Hearings, supra note 3, at 34.
20 ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS (Jan. 26, 1977). For a critical summary and analysis of the Guide, see
Fugate, The Department ofjustice7s Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L.
645 (1977).
21 ANTITRUST GUIDEsupra note 20, at 4. See also Turner, United States Antitrust Policy and
American Foreign Commerce, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1967, at 205 (V. Cameron- ed. 1967).
22 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 20, at 4.
23 The Guide explains, however, that Webb-Pomerene associations are precluded from
"(i) artificially or intentionally restrain[ing] U.S. domestic trade or affect[ing] U.S. domestic
prices, or (ii) restrain[ing] the export trade of any U.S. competitor of the association." Id.
This language must be reconciled with the variation in language appearing in the Sherman
Act-and the Webb-Pomerene Act. The certification standards under ETCA's Title III are,
arguably, more lenient, as is Title IV's requirement that the precluded effect on U.S. com-
merce be "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable." See notes 130-36 infia and accom-
panying text.
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straints, that may otherwise violate the Sherman Act should
nonetheless be allowed in order to promote the statutory policy of
fostering U.S. exports.2 4
The potential for confusion in reconciling apparently different
statutory standards and administrative interpretations 25 has been
compounded by the few instances of judicial decisionmaking con-
cerning the Webb-Pomerene Act, as well as the body of case law in-
terpreting the scope of the Sherman Act. Few cases interpret the
Webb-Pomerene Act. Furthermore, it is unclear whether such law-
suits would be brought today by the Department of Justice either
under ETCA's Title IV or the less expansionist extraterritorial ap-
proach apparently favored by the 1977 Antitrust Guide.
The leading case interpreting the Webb-Pomerene Act is United
States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. 26 In Minnesota Mining,
the Justice Department charged that U.S. manufacturers of coated
abrasives and their related export association had established an al-
leged combination in restraint of trade based on joint action they
took to preserve and expand their foreign markets which were declin-
ing due to foreign countries' tariffs, quotas, import controls, dollar
shortages, foreign exchange restrictions, local preference campaigns,
and similar nationalistic measures.2 7 The Justice Department chal-
24 See notes 8-15 supra and accompanying text.
25 The conflict has also existed between agencies. For example, the Justice Department
has said the following about the Webb-Pomerene Act:
To be actionable, joint activity must have a substantial and foreseeable effect on
United States domestic or foreign commerce. Joint activity intended to impact
outside the territory of the U.S. and carried on so as not to affect competition be-
tween the parties in the United States is unlikely to raise any question under Ameri-
can antitrust law. Accordingly, it has been the consistent position of the
Department of Justice that the antitrust exemption found in the Webb-Pomerene
Act of 1918 is unnecessary to provide protection for export trade associations since
the normal activities undertaken by such associations have as their exclusive focus
markets abroad.
1981 Hearings, supra note 3, at 310. At the same time, a Federal Trade Commission official
adopted a fundamentally different perspective:
The Export Trade Act, also known as the Webb-Pomerene Act, was adopted in
1918 during a period of resurgent interest in foreign trade. The basic purpose of the
Act is to increase exports by granting antitrust immunity to domestic competitors
for joint activities in export trade that might otherwise be illegal. For example, the
Webb-Pomerenc Act allows firms that are competitors in domestic markets to joint-
ly fix export prices and allocate foreign markets-activities that could in some cir-
cumstances violate the antitrust laws in the absence of an exemption.
1981 Hearings, supa note 3, at 310-11.
26 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
27 Id. at 958.
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lenged the association's behavior under sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act on the ground that
[i]t is unlawful for four-fifths of the American export trade to com-
bine to export exclusively through one corporation, not available to
others and from which they cannot withdraw at will, and for that
corporation to fix the quotas within which and prices at which it
will buy from its members and the prices at which foreign distribu-
tors sell its members' products, to require its distributors to refrain
from handling abrasives made by foreign . . . distributors, and to
charge higher prices to American exporters than to foreign
distributors.28
The court expressly rejected the government's contentions and
approved the association's export activities. The court stated that
Webb-Pomerene associations could be established by the majority of
enterprises in an industry, could serve as the members' sole foreign
outlet, could agree to purchase goods only from member producers,
could fix resale prices for its foreign distributors, could fix prices and
quotas for members, and could insist that its foreign distributors han-
dle only members' products.29 At the same time, the Minnesota Min-
ing court acknowledged the paradox lying at the heart of the Webb-
Pomerene Act:
Now it may very well be thhit every successful export company does
inevitably affect adversely the foreign commerce of those not in the
joint enterprise and does bring the members of the enterprise so
closely together as to affect adversely the members' competition in
domestic commerce. Thus every export company may be a re-
straint. But if there are only these inevitable -consequences an ex-
port association is not an unlawful restraint. The Webb-Pomerene
Act is an expression of Congressional will that such a restraint shall
be permitted. And the courts are required to give as ungrudging
support to the policy of the Webb-Pomerene as to the policy of the
Sherman Act. Statutory eclecticism is not a proper judicial
function.30
Comparing the result in Minnesota Mining with the decision in
United States v. United States Alkali Export Assocation31 more clearly
reveals how parties considering establishing Webb-Pomerene associa-
tions might become confused about the applicable legal standards.
In Alkali Export Association, the government challenged the export ac-
tivities of the United States Alkali Export Association, specifically
28 Id. at 964-65.
29 Id. at 965.
30 Id.
31 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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alleging, inter alia, the illegality of the association's entry into a series
of agreements and participation in other concerted practices that re-
stricted the export of alkalis from the United States to many world
markets. The association claimed protection under the Webb-
Pomerene Act, contending that U.S. antitrust laws "have no applica-
bility to worldwide apportionment of territory, establishment of ex-
clusive markets, and the fixing and maintenance of prices between
foreign competitors and export associations organized in the United
States under the terms of the [Webb-Pomerene] Act."'32
The court concluded that the association's activities were not
protected under the Webb-Pomerene Act and noted that section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act,33 which prohibits "unfair meth-
ods of competition," enjoyed "world-wide operation. '34 As a result,
the court appeared to be enforcing U.S. competitive standards
around the world regardless of the presence of any direct, substantial,
or reasonably foreseeable effect on the U.S. domestic market:
[T]he conclusion is irresistible that the Webb-Pomerene Act affords
no right to export associations to engage on a world-wide scale in
practices so antithetical to the American philosophy of free compe-
tition. The international agreements between defendants allocat-
ing exclusive markets, assigning quotas in sundry markets, fixing
prices on an international scale, and selling through joint agents are
not those "agreements in the course of export trade" which the
Webb Act places beyond the reach of the Sherman Law.35
This broad assertion of the extraterritorial application of U.S. anti-
trust laws is difficult to reconcile with the Minnesota Mining result.
The resulting enforcement unpredictability has discouraged reliance
on the Webb-Pomerene Act.
In addition to the Webb-Pomerene Act's basic vagueness, the
act has lacked success in stimulating the creation of export associa-
tions for reasons unrelated to the act itself. Although the few cases
construing the Webb-Pomerene Act have tended to uphold the nar-
row exemption from antitrust liability, at least some lower federal
courts have recently interpreted the Sherman Act so broadly as to
create additional uncertainty as to whether exempt Webb-Pomerene
activities would be legal under the Sherman Act. While the Justice
32 Id at 69.
33 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976): "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting com-
merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared
unlawful."
34 86 F. Supp. at 67.
35 Id. at 70.
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Department stated in its 1977 Antitrust Guide that "[n]ormally, [it]
would not challenge a joint venture whose only effect was to reduce
competition among the parties in foreign markets, even where goods
or services were being exported from the United States,' 36 some fed-
eral courts have reached different conclusions. At least four cases,
Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. ,'37 Indaustria Siciliana As-
falti, Bitumi, Sp.A. v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co. ,38 United States v.
Lemer Co. ,39 and Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc. ,40
have still found the Sherman Act to apply in situations where the
principal negative effect falls on a non-U.S. entity outside the United
States. In recent years, the heightened controversy over the extrater-
ritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws has only furthered the con-
fusion in this area of the law.
4 1
B. ETCA-s Legislative Background
In light of the Webb-Pomerene Act's history of uncertain en-
36 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 20, at 21.
37 375 F. Supp. 610, modified in part, 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
38 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,256 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
39 215 F. Supp. 603 (D. Hawaii 1963).
40 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
41 The criteria for applying the Sherman Act, whose provisions do reach some restraints
of trade which do not necessarily have a direct and substantial effect on United States foreign
commerce, remain unclear. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287
(3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976)
(in applying Sherman Act to conduct abroad, considerations such as comity, fairness, and
other "balancing factors" should be examined in assessing jurisdiction). Consideration of bal-
ancing factors is consistent with the 1965 Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965). The
proposed new Restatement would establish "reasonableness" as the basic principle governing
the propriety of extraterritorial jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 403 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). The drafters of ETCA's Title IV were
probably well aware of the increasing use of the "reasonableness" principle in premising juris-
diction on conduct having a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S.
trade or commerce. See generally Cira, The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust
Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247, 272-78 (1982) (approving Timberlane/Mannington Mills fac-
tors); Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 500
(1981); Haight, International Law and the Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE
L.J. 643 (1954); Jones, Extraterritoriality in US. Antitrust: An International "H-Iot Potato", 11 INT'L
LAw. 415 (1977); Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public
and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982); Note, Timberlane: Three Steps
Forward, One Step Backwards, 15 INT'L LAw. 419 (1981) (criticizing Timberlane's "balancing"
test while favoring Alcoa's "effects" test); Comment, Recent Developments-Antitrust: Extraterrito-
rialJurisdiction under the E fects Doctrine-A Conflicts Approach, 46 FORD. L. REV. 354 (1977). See
a/so Griffin, Should U. Limit Extraterritorial Reach of Its Law?, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 22, 1982, at
14; J. Shenefield, Extraternitoriality and Antitrust-New Variations on a Familiar Theme, Remarks
Before the International Law Institute and the ABA Section of International Law (Dec. 10,
1980), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 50,424, at 55,962.
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forcement and its limited effectiveness in stimulating export sales,
legislation was introduced in 1978 to encourage the formation of ex-
port trading companies through amending the Webb-Pomerene Act.
As already noted, however, the legislation which was ultimately
passed left the Webb-Pomerene Act untouched. 42 During 1979 and
1980, the Senate's Subcommittee on International Finance of the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs held hearings on
legislation introduced by Senator Adlai E. Stevenson. 43 The legisla-
tion was ultimately revised by Senator John Heinz in the Senate
Banking Committee's markup, and a new bill, S. 2718, was reported
out and passed by the Senate by a vote of 77-0 on September 3, 1980.
Although subcommittee hearings were held in May and June of
1980 before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy
and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the House of Repre-
sentatives failed to consider the legislation. The legislation was
presented and passed again by the Senate by a vote of 93-0 during
the 97th Congress on April 8, 1981. 4 4 The Subcommittee on the Ju-
diciary held hearings on legislation submitted to amend the Sherman
and Clayton Acts to exclude various types of export activities from
their jurisdiction.45 Related bills were also introduced in the House
throughout 1981, but no final action was taken by the House of Rep-
resentatives that year.
Throughout 1982, several House committees conducted more
hearings into the need for export trading companies. Finally, in late
summer, the House of Representatives passed a bill that was substan-
tially the same as the Senate-passed bill. Discrepancies were ulti-
mately resolved on October 1, 1982, when the Senate and the House
of Representatives approved the Conference Report.46 The Presi-
dent signed the act a week later.
One rather unusual feature of the legislation ultimately passed is
the comprehensive list of congressional "findings" which comprises
much of Title I of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982. Sec-
tion 102(a) lists eleven findings as to why export trading companies
42 See note l8supra.
43 Hearings on S 2379, S. 864 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Hearings on S 864, S 1499, S.
1663, and S 1741 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
44 127 CONG. REc. S3667 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981).
45 Hearings on H.R. 2326 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciag, 97th Cong., 1st Seass. (1981).
46 H.R. REP. No. 924, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. REP. No. 644, 97th Cong., 2d Sss'.
(1982).
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are necessary to stimulate export activities in particular and the U.S.
economy in general.47 This section is principally responsible for
characterizing the legislation as designed to increase the "export con-
sciousness" of American manufacturing and service companies. For
example, the findings in section 102(a) assert that U.S. exports create
and maintain one out of every nine U.S. manufacturing jobs and
generate one out of every seven dollars in value of all U.S. goods
produced. They further acknowledge that "tens of thousands of
small- and medium-sized United States businesses produce exporta-
ble goods or services but do not engage in exporting. '48 The act also
recognizes the extent to which service-related industries, as distin-
guished from manufacturing, have become an important characteris-
tic of the U.S. economy:
[T]he rapidly growing service-related industries are vital to the
well-being of the United States economy inasmuch as they create
jobs for seven out of every ten Americans, provide 65 per centum of
the Nation's gross national product, and offer the greatest potential
for significantly increased industrial trade involving finished
products.49
In what can only be considered a fairly blunt statement about why
the United States has failed to develop export competitiveness, the
act further observes that "the development of export trading compa-
nies in the United States has been hampered by business attitudes
and by Government regulations." 50
C. ETCA s Objectives
In recognizing the need to stimulate and promote additional
U.S. exports, the Export Trading Company Act's declaration of pur-
pose states an intent
to increase . . . exports of products and services by encouraging
more efficient provision of export trade services to United States
producers and suppliers by establishing an office within the Depart-
ment of Commerce to promote the formation of export trade as-
sociations and export trading companies, by permitting bank
holding companies, bankers' banks, and Edge Act corporations and
agreement corporations that are subsidiaries of bank holding com-
panies to invest in export trading companies, by reducing restric-
tions on trade financing provided by financial institutions, and by
47 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 102(a), 96 Stat. 1233 (1982) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4001).
48 Id. § 102(a)(4).
49 Id. § 102(a)(2).
50 Id. § 102(a)(8).
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modifying the application of the antitrust laws to certain export
trade.5'
In addressing the twin problems of inadequate financing and per-
ceived antitrust uncertainty, Congress did not call for substantially
increased federal regulation or major new federal spending. Al-
though the Federal Reserve Board and the Department of Com-
merce have issued appropriate proposed implementing regulations, 52
ETCA's focus is permissive rather than mandatory; individuals, cor-
porations, and banking organizations wanting to take advantage of
the act's opportunities are free to do so with what was designed as a
de minimis regulatory compliance burden. Through this approach,
the bill's sponsors intended to create a more favorable economic and
regulatory environment for promoting and financing U.S. exports.
ETCA's primary objective, as set forth in the legislative findings,
is to improve U.S. export performance by facilitating the creation of
U.S.-based export trading companies. In particular, the legislation is
intended to stimulate exports by the tens of thousands of small- to
medium-sized U.S. manufacturing and service firms which either do
not presently export at all or which could increase exports given a
more conducive regulatory environment. Recognizing that the
transactional aspects of export activity, such as additional economic
cost and required business know-how, may present barriers to in-
creased exports by such firms, the legislation is intended to foster the
growth of intermediary firms capable of performing the full range of
export services.
To a certain extent, the models for the intermediary export trad-
ing companies whose development would be encouraged by ETCA
are the diversified trading companies existing in many European
countries and in East Asian countries, particularly Japan.53  Pres-
ently a variety of U.S. enterprises provide export services, such as
51 Id. § 102(b), 96 Stat. at 1234.
52 The Commerce Department, in conjunction with the Justice Department, issued pro-
posed regulations on December 21, 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 56,972 (1982). The Federal Reserve
Board issued its proposed regulations on January 25, 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 3375 (1983).
53 A review by the Congressional Research Service concluded that "[t]he exporting suc-
cess of European and Japanese trading companies provides a model upon which the U.S.
Government could encourage and support the formation and expansion of somewhat similar
entities in the United States." R. AHEARN, EXPORT TRADING COMPANIES, Issue Brief No.
IB80044, at 2 (Congressional Research Service Sept. 17, 1982). Adding that U.S. export man-
ufacturers faced both financing and antitrust impediments not encountered by their overseas
counterparts, the study characterized the proposed ETC legislation as "just one aspect of a
broader review of U.S. policy and regulations that affect the competitiveness of U.S. exports"
that is designed to "eliminate or lessen U.S. Government disincentives and provide greater
incentives for U.S. exports." Id at 5.
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freight forwarding, brokerage, shipping, insurance, export financing,
legal advice, and foreign marketing and distribution. However, such
enterprises typically offer only one or a few of the services required to
complete an export transaction. By contrast, the overseas trading
companies generally possess substantially greater financial resources
than these U.S. export-related firms as well as sophisticated multi-
dimensional capabilities which enable them to perform all of the
functions required to engage in export trade. Those few U.S.-based
firms that have developed a large-scale export capability have tended
to deal in raw materials, such as minerals or grain, or in specialized
segments of manufacturing, such as the aircraft industry. 54
Japan's general trading companies, or sogo shosha, are perhaps
the most outstanding examples of the kinds of international trading
conglomerates against which U.S. exporters must today compete.
The success of the Japanese trading houses has both reflected and
substantially contributed to the rapid growth of the Japanese econ-
omy since the end of World War I. Most of these companies began
a century ago or less, following the opening of trade routes between
Japan and the West in the 1850's and 1860's. Since that time, the
largest of the sogo shosha have grown from small shipping and mer-
cantile firms into giant conglomerates that have dominated Japan's
post-World War II domestic economy and exceed in scope virtually
all other export trading firms on the international scene.55 Certain of
54 Seegenerally D. MORGAN, THE MERCHANTS OF GRAIN (1979); A. YOUNG, THE SoGo
SHOSHA: JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL TRADING COMPANIES 17 (1979). Several U.S. manufac-
turers, such as International Business Machines Corporation and the Boeing Company, have,
of course, developed extensive sales, servicing, and, to some extent, manufacturing operations
abroad that have enabled them to penetrate foreign markets effectively. However, these com-
panies' foreign networks are used largely, if not exclusively, to promote the parent entity's
products and therefore do not act as trading companies in the sense of dealing in the mer-
chandise and services of a variety of providers, as do, for example, the major Japanese trading
houses.
In anticipation of ETCA's passage, several major U.S. companies have announced plans
to establish export trading subsidiaries. Sears Roebuck & Co. announced a plan to set up its
Sears World Trade Inc. subsidiary in the spring of 1982, intended to promote sales of various
consumer products, including some manufactured by current Sears suppliers. General Elec-
tric Trading Co., also established in the spring of 1982, has announced plans to represent
abroad several U.S. manufacturers of industrial and technical products. Other U.S. compa-
nies such as Burlington Northern Inc. and Control Data Corporation have realigned existing
international marketing divisions to create trading capabilities suited to promote additional
products and suppliers. See DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) No. 205, at P-2 to P-4
(Oct. 22, 1982). See also An Overview of Export Trading in the United States, American Banker,
Feb. 17, 1983, at 26.
55 See generally A. YOUNG, Slpra note 54; Sogo Shosha" The Japanese Example, American
Banker, Feb. 17, 1983, at 30. There is ample evidence in ETCA's legislative history that the
major international trading firms, and particularly the Japanese sogo shosha, were perceived
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these firms are, in fact, among the leading exporters from the United
States.56
A brief description of the operations of the sogo shosha trading
companies may illustrate the nature of this formidable competition.
The general trading companies' principal business is, of course, trad-
ing, both as principals in purchase or sale transactions and as in-
termediaries for other deals. Single-product sales represent the most
basic kind of transaction engaged in, although the sogo shosha com-
monly engage in multi-product sales to individual customers as well.
More significantly, perhaps, these firms are increasingly involved in
highly complex transactions, such as the sale of a major industrial
facility's components or even the export of an entire plant on a turn-
key basis whereby the necessary equipment, technology, and consult-
ing services of numerous manufacturers and suppliers are
coordinated and packaged to the customer. The firms frequently en-
by Congress as substantial contributors to the success of their home countries' economic well-
being in general and their export performance in particular. For example, the Report of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs in S. 734, the Senate version of
ETCA, noted that "most European countries, as well as Japan and Korea, possess sophisti-
cated, large-scale general purpose trading companies which perform the full range of requisite
functions for potential exporters; the success of such companies has contributed significantly
to the export earnings of all of our major trade competitors." S. REP. No. 27, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1982). Senator John Glenn submitted a written statement to the Subcommittee on
International Finance and Monetary Policy of this Senate committee which noted that "[i]n
Japan, for example, the top ten trading organizations, the Sogo Shoshas, account for approxi-
mately 60 percent of Japan's imports and 50 percent of its exports" and that "[t]rading com-
panies have also played an important role in the economic growth of many European
countries. Yet, despite their historical and international success, trading companies have not
flourished in the United States." 1981 Hearings, supra -note 3, at 170.
Similarly, John M. Boles, president of Boles & Co., a U.S.-based international trading
company described as being organized along the lines of the large overseas trading compa-
nies, testified at the Senate subcommittee hearings:
As U.S. trading companies will compete with foreign trading companies and
various consortia, the issue of credibility becomes important. A small U.S. trading
company is at a great disadvantage when compared to a Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Jar-
dine Matheson, or Inchcape. However, a U.S. trading company affiliated with, or
partially owned by, a major U.S. commercial bank becomes quite a different reality
in the eyes of a foreign customer. International trade is predominantly controlled
by extremely large enterprises, and small unparented U.S. export companies are
likely to become nonevents.
Id. at 215.
56 According to testimony given by Senator Adlai Stevenson before the Subcommittee on
International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, the sixth largest U.S. exporter in 1980 was the American subsidiary of
Mitsui & Co. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 3, at 14. Additionally, Nissho-Iwai Co., the sixth
largest Japanese trading company, has claimed that its U.S. subsidiary is responsible for 1% of
U.S. exports. Id.; Gordon, Exporters Look Enviously at Japan in Pressingfor New US Export Laws,
Nat'l Journal, June 21, 1980, at 1021.
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gage in two-way or barter trade, where one commodity is traded for
another and no cash consideration is paid, and multi-party trades,
including the negotiation and settlement of transactions entirely
outside of Japan and involving non-Japanese products. Barter trans-
actions as well as "switch trade," involving the importing of goods
from one country and payment through use of a third country's cur-
rency as the currency of settlement, are increasingly common means
of avoiding problems of currency convertibility and unstable ex-
change rates, yet require highly skilled understanding of diverse mar-
kets and other countries' economic and monetary conditions. 57
In addition to conducting actual trading activity, the giant
Japanese firms, with their extensive financial and industrial resources
and connections, are able to engage in a range of other trade-related
services. These include handling all the necessary paperwork and
documentation related to an export transaction, obtaining insurance
coverage, and providing warehousing and transportation services.
These services may be arranged on a contract basis; often, they are
performed by an arm of the trading company itself. The sogo shosha
also engage in certain kinds of manufacturing, generally through
subsidiaries or joint ventures, although the purpose of such manufac-
turing is usually more to generate trading opportunities than to de-
velop an independent manufacturing capability. Through their
access to (and, in some cases, ownership affiliation with) major banks,
the sogo shosha are able to facilitate or extend credit, loans, and loan
guarantees to small- and medium-sized buyers, sellers and suppliers.
The system is mutually beneficial because by using the sogo shosha as
financial intermediaries, the banks avoid the higher costs and greater
risk that may be associated in dealing directly with small borrowers,
and can indirectly use the sogo shosha's assessment of the small firms'
creditworthiness. Conversely, borrowing through the sogo shosha
gives the small manufacturer, exporter, or purchaser more ready ac-
cess to capital than might otherwise be available by going directly to
57 According to the Commerce Department, in 1976 approximately 28% of East-West
trade involved some form of barter arrangement, with 40% of such trade expected to be in
barter form by 1981. A number of major U.S. firms have begun to develop barter expertise,
but much learning remains to be done. According to one U.S. international trade executive,
"Barter is an idea whose time has come, and that means that a lot of companies are finding
themselves in novel situations." He added, "If Rockwell sells a $100 million product in a
barter transaction, what the hell is Rockwell going to do with $100 million worth of rice?"
Gordon, subra note 56, at 1021. Countertrade is being recognized as increasingly important
in transactions with developing countries that are chronically short on foreign currency
reserves.
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the commercial banks.58
Through their evolution, the sogo shosha have developed exten-
sive worldwide staffing and communications networks.59 These net-
works have enabled them to gather and process efficiently
information about such subjects as the size of potential markets, com-
petitive manufacturers in the export target country, foreign exchange
controls and currency fluctuations, distribution channels, commodity
prices, tariff and non-tariff barriers, technology-licensing require-
ments, and other factors directly affecting potential export transac-
tions. This vast storehouse of information, and the ability to
communicate it rapidly from one country to another, can invaluably
assist the sogo shosha and their customers in seeking to take rapid ad-
vantage of new trading opportunities.60
The major sogo shosha are not the only international trading
firms with which the newly organized U.S. ETCs will have to com-
pete. The large general trading companies constitute only the top
58 The equity and debt affiliations between the largest sogo shosha and the major Japa-
nese banks (often bearing the same name as the giant trading houses) are highly complex and
reflect a lengthy historical evolution. None of the large trading companies appears to control
a major bank. However, they do hold substantial minority interests, often in several financial
institutions. For example, in 1973 Nissho-Iwai Co. owned 7.47% of the shares of Sanwa Bank,
7.31% of Daiichi Kangyo Bank, 3.78% of Daiwa Bank, and 3.13% of the Bank of Tokyo.
Similarly, in the same year C. Itoh & Co. owned 8.72% of Sumitomo Bank, 8.72% of Daiichi
Kangyo Bank, 5.23% of the Bank of Tokyo, and 3.43% of Fuji Bank. Conversely, the
financial institutions have substantial equity interests in the trading companies, owning
nearly 50% or more of the shares of the ten largest sogo shosha. For example, as of March 31,
1975, over 48% of the shares of Mitsubishi Corporation were owned by 72 financial institu-
tions. A. YOUNG, supra note 54, at 51-55. The sogo shosha obtain a substantial portion of their
considerable loan financing from affiliated institutions as well. For example, as of March 31,
1973, Mitsubishi Bank had obtained 14.8% of its debt from Mitsubishi Bank and 25.3% of its
debt from Mitsubishi Bank group financial institutions. Id. at 43. See also A. SAMPSON, THE
MONEY LENDERS 208-11 (1981); Sogo Shosha: The Japanese Example, American Banker, Feb.
17, 1983, at 30.
59 As an example, Mitsubishi Corporation had approximatley 3,500 foreign representa-
tives in 120 offices around the world in 1980. Gordon, supra note 56, at 1020. The effective-
ness of this overseas corps is magnified by the presence of substantial numbers of Japanese
foreign service commercial officers, who may number more in one country than the entire
contingent of commercial officers in the U.S. foreign service, according to a senior Commerce
Department official. Id.
60 Young recounts an example where such rapid communication of information was val-
uable with respect to a prospective lowering of copper production quotas by the Zambian
government in 1974. The Mitsubishi Corporation's local information source in that country
alerted a joint venture in which Mitsubishi was participating of the quota reduction only a
half hour before it was officially announced. Mitsubishi, in return, notified its customers and
officials at once, enabling them to take the necessary compensatory actions before the world
copper price rose by $70 a ton. Such actions were completed only twenty minutes after the
official announcement of the Zambian action and avoided considerable losses for the firms
affected. A. YOUNG, supra note 54, at 63.
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echelon of Japanese trading entities, below which are hundreds of
smaller firms actively engaged in export activity. In addition, large
multi-dimensional trading companies exist in various Western 'Euro-
pean countries as well as Canada, Hong Kong, and Singapore. How-
ever, these non-Japanese firms are individually far smaller, in terms
of their annual sales volumes, than the major sogo shosha. Because of
their sales dominance, the giant Japanese firms are likely to become
the benchmark from which the success of new U.S. export trading
companies will be measured. 61
Admittedly, there are several factors peculiar to Japan which in
part may account for the success of the sogo shosha, including their
close working relationship with Japanese banks, the Japanese gov-
ernment's pro-export trade and tariff policies, and the close interlock-
ing directorates of many of Japan's 8,000 trading companies.
However, U.S. trading companies will nevertheless be able to emu-
late several Japanese practices in the development of a distinctly
American form of export company. Although the U.S. regulatory
environment no doubt will shape the ultimate evolution of the U.S.
trading company, there are several structural features of the Japa-
nese sogo shosha, such as their ability to provide comprehensive one-
stop export services for a variety of products, that their U.S. counter-
parts can use as models.
II. The Participation of Banking Institutions In U.S. Export
Trading Companies
One of ETCA's most important features is the provision al-
lowing for the involvement of U.S. banks in export trading activi-
ties.62 Traditionally, U.S. banks have been prohibited from engaging
in activities that are commercial in nature. The "business of bank-
ing" has, to a large extent, been considered as "banking" and not as
"commerce. ' 63 In contrast to the attitude in most foreign countries,
61 As of the year ended March 31, 1977, the ten largest Japanese general trading compa-
nies ranked by sales were Mitsubishi Corporation; Mitsui & Co., Ltd.; Marubeni Corporation;
C. Itoh Co., Ltd.; Sumimoto Corp.; Nissho-Iwai Co., Ltd.; Toyomenka Kaisha, Ltd.;
Kanematsu Gosho Ltd.; Nichimen Co., Ltd.; and Ataka & Co., Ltd. See A. YOUNG, supra
note 54, at 23. The dominance of these firms can be measured in a number of ways. For
example, in fiscal year 1973 the ten largest sogo shosha accounted for 53% of Japan's export
total and 64% of Japan's import total on a customs clearance basis. These firms are not
exclusively export, import, and third-country-trade oriented, of course; a substantial propor-
tion of their business also comes fron domestic commerce within Japan.
62 Pub. L. No. 97-290, §§ 202-203, 96 Stat. 1233, 1235-38 (1982)(to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1843).
63 See generally Waxman, 1982 Act Delineates Role of Banks in Export Trading, LEGAL TIMES,
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American banks have long been restricted from participating in the
risks inherent in commercial and industrial ventures. The power of
commercial banks to engage in most types of investment banking ac-
tivities was sharply circumscribed through enactment of the Banking
Act of 1933,64 but national banks have been prohibited, with limited
exceptions, from operating or investing in commercial and industrial
enterprises dating from the National Bank Acts of 1863 and 1864.65
Over the years, banking institutions have gradually been able to
expand their authority to enter non-banking activities. Certain of
these activities have been permitted through administrative rulings
by the Comptroller of the Currency, under the provision of the Na-
tional Banking Act allowing banks to "exercise. . . all such inciden-
tal power as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking. ' 66
Similarly, banks have acquired authority to underwrite limited types
of revenue bonds.67
Through the creation of bank holding companies (BHCs), bank-
ing organizations, although not banks themselves, have been able to
diversify further into non-banking activities. Under the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act of 1956, as amended,68 BHCs may presently en-
gage in a number of activities not permitted to banks, including
owning up to 5 percent of the outstanding shares of any company,
and investing in the shares of any company, in any amount, the ac-
tivities of which the Federal Reserve Board has determined "to be so
closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be
a proper incident thereto. '69 In exercising its discretionary authority
under this provision, the Federal Reserve Board has permitted BHCs
to provide certain financial, fiduciary, and insurance services. More
recently, BHCs have been permitted to acquire savings and loan as-
sociations and brokerage firms, although they have not been permit-
ted to enter areas traditionally regarded as more speculative, such as
commodity trading. BHCs also are less restricted than are banks in
Nov. 15, 1982, at 14; Gordon, supra note 56, at 1018; R. AHEARN & W. JACKSON, supra note
15, at 16-19.
64 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Passage of
the Banking Act, otherwise known as the Glass-Steagall Act, was a reaction to the widely
perceived belief that undue concentrations of financial power, and abuses of such power,
contributed directly to the stock market collapse of 1929-32 and the resulting Great
Depression.
65 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976, Supp. 1 1977 & Supp. 11 1980).
69 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6)-(8) (1976).
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engaging in various business activities overseas, and can engage in
conduct in other countries that would be unlawful in the United
States. This involvement can take place through branches of U.S.
banks operating abroad, through Edge Act and Agreement Act cor-
porations, and through direct investments in foreign banks and other
foreign enterprises. 70
ETCA expresses congressional intent to encourage U.S. banking
institutions to participate in the ownership and management of
ETCs, thus continuing the trend toward expanding banking institu-
tions' authority. U.S. banking institutions' investment in ETCs was
believed to constitute a potent stimulus for the export expansion
sought by the legislation's sponsors. For example, the Report of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs accom-
panying S. 734, the Senate version of ETCA, stated:
Banks with international offices, experience in trade financing,
business contacts abroad, international marketing knowledge, and
familiarity with domestic U.S. producers are the most likely source
of leadership in forming export trading companies. Their skills are
important to the organization and management of trading compa-
nies. A number of large non-Japanese trading companies are
owned by banks in other countries. For example, Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corp. owns a 33 percent controlling interest in
Hutchinson Whampoa Limited; Midland Bank Limited owns con-
trolling interests in at least three trading companies; Barclay's Bank
International owns 24.5 percent of Tozer, Kernsley and Millbourn;
Credit Lyonnais owns 80 percent of Essor PME; and Banco de Bra-
zil owns 100 percent of Beke Company. 71
Congress considered the absence of close ties with financial insti-
tutions to be a major hindrance to the growth of existing U.S. export
management companies. Such firms are frequently small, thinly
capitalized, and restricted in their ability to pursue aggressively the
expansion of U.S. exports. Congress further recognized that while
many U.S. banks presently provide export-related financing services,
they do so on a reactive, rather than an active, basis. For example,
many U.S. banks use their export-related skills only at their custom-
ers' request, much as they would for any borrower or other bank cus-
70 An Edge Act corporation is a corporation chartered, supervised, and examined by the
Federal Reserve Board for the purpose of engaging in foreign or international banking or
other foreign or international financial operations. An Agreement Act corporation is a fed-
eral or state-chartered corporation that has entered into an agreement or undertaking with
the Federal Reserve Board that it will not exercise any power that is impermissible for an
Edge Act corporation. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 601-603, 611-631 (1976).
71 S. REP. No. 27, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1981).
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tomer, rather than initiating or helping to initiate export
transactions. By permitting banking institutions to participate di-
rectly in trading companies through investment and management,
Congress has assumed that they will have strong incentives to seek
out export markets and facilitate exports.
In addition to possessing financing capabilities, U.S. banking or-
ganizations possess two principal attributes of use to ETCs. First,
through their domestic banking operations, banking organizations
have direct relationships with many small- and medium-sized com-
panies who may produce exportable products but are not presently
in the export business. Second, through their international branches
or correspondent banks, banking institutions are in a position to
identify potential foreign markets and customers. Congress thus en-
visioned banking institutions as functioning both as financial in-
termediaries in export trade and also as active promoters of such
trade.72
Title II, designated the "Bank Export Services Act," is the por-
tion of ETCA that authorizes banking institutions' participation in
ETCs. In section 202 of the act, Congress declared its purpose as
providing for the "meaningful and effective" participation of certain
kinds of banking institutions in the financing and development of
U.S. export trading companies. In addition, section 202 directs the
Federal Reserve Board, which will exercise jurisdiction over bank in-
vestments in ETCs, to
(1) provide for the establishment of export trading companies with
power sufficiently broad to enable them to compete with similar
foreign-owned institutions in the United States and abroad;
(2) afford to United States commerce, industry, and agriculture,
especially small-and-medium size firms, a means of exporting at all
times;
72 Foreign banks having extensive branching networks in their home countries, some of
which also already have agency-or representative offices in the U.S., would seem to be partic-
ularly well-suited to provide interactive relationships with prospective export customers. In
recent years, moreover, the number of U.S. banks owned by foreign banking organizations
has substantially increased. For example, in 1980 British-based Midland Bank acquired a
controlling interest in Crocker Bank, a major California bank. Barclays Bank has also ac-
quired considerable banking operations in New York and California. Several leading Japa-
nese banks have also acquired banking operations in California.
Congress may have had the possibility of substantial ETC participation by foreign-based
banks in mind when it directed the Federal Reserve Board to report within two years of the
date of enactment of ETCA its recommendations "on the effects of ownership of United
States banks by foreign banking organizations affiliated with trading companies doing busi-
ness in the United States." Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 205, 96 Stat. 1233, 1238 (1982) (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843).
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(3) foster the participation by regional and smaller banks in the
development of export trading companies; and
(4) facilitate the formation of joint venture export trading compa-
nies between bank holding companies and non-bank firms that pro-
vide for the efficient combination of complementary trade and
financing services designed to create export trading companies that
can handle all of an exporting company's needs. 73
According to the Conference Report, these objectives, along with the
purposes set forth in Title I of the act, if properly pursued, will result
in development of "effective, 'full-service' trading companies with
bank holding company involvement that will effectively and aggres-
sively market American products and will not be disadvantaged or
limited" in competing with foreign trading companies or U.S.-based
ETCs owned by non-bank firms. 74
Section 203 of the act allows bank holding companies to partici-
pate in ETCs subject to Federal Reserve Board oversight. Section
203 amends section 4(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act 75 to pro-
vide a new section 4(c)(14), which allows BHCs to acquire shares of
any export trading company whose acquisition or formation by a
BHC has not been disapproved by the Federal Reserve, subject to an
overall limitation of such investments to no more than 5 percent of a
BHC's consolidated capital and surplus. ETCA requires BHCs to
provide the Federal Reserve with sixty days prior written notice of a
proposed investment in an ETC.76 This disapproval period may be
extended by the Federal Reserve for an additional thirty days if the
applicant has not submitted all required information or the Federal
Reserve believes that any material information submitted is substan-
tially inaccurate. During this period, the Federal Reserve may disap-
prove a proposed investment only if it makes one of the following
three findings:
(1) such disapproval is necessary to prevent unsafe or unsound
banking practices, undue concentration of resources, decreased or
unfair competition, or conflicts of interests;
73 Id. § 202.
74 H.R. REP. No. 924, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), repinted in 128 CONG. REc. H8347
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982).
75 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1976).
76 Under the Federal Reserve Board's proposed regulations issued January 25, 1983, the
notification would be required to include a description of the nature and extent of, and the
managerial resources related to, each activity which the ETC proposes to engage in, classified
by four-digit Standard Industrial Classification. If the ETC desires to expand its activities
beyond those described in its initial notification, it would be required to file an additional
notification giving the Board 60 days' prior notice of such additional activities. See 48 Fed.
Reg. 3379 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.34) (proposed Jan. 25, 1983).
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(2) the Board finds that such investment would affect the financial
or managerial resources of a bank holding company to an extent
which is likely to have a materially adverse effect on the safety and
soundness of any subsidiary bank of such bank holding company;
or
(3) the bank holding.company fails to furnish the information re-
quired [by the Board to be submitted by an applicant]. 77
The Board is required to inform applicants of the basis for dis-
approval, in writing, within three days after it decides to disapprove
a prospective investment. Absent the Board's disapproval within the
applicable time period, a BHC is free to invest in an ETC.
Besides limiting the amount of the BHC's investment in ETCs,
ETCA also limits the amount of credit that may be extended to an
ETC in which the BHC invests. The total amount of credit extended
by the BHC and by all its subsidiaries may not exceed at any one
time 10 percent of the BHC's consolidated capital and surplus (ex-
cluding for purposes of calculating the aggregate extensions of credit
the amount of the BHC's equity investment in the ETC). In addi-
tion, in an effort to prevent favoritism or undue influence, BHCs and
their subsidiaries may not extend credit to an ETC in which it has
made an investment, or to customers of the ETC, on terms more
favorable than those afforded to similar homeowners under similar
circumstances. Such extensions of credit may not involve more than
the normal terms of repayment or present other unusual features. 78
77 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 203(3), 96 Stat. 1233, 1236-38 (1982) (adding 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(14)(A)(iv)).
78 Id. (adding 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14)(B)). The Federal Reserve Board's proposed regu-
lations also would extend the non-preference requirement with respect to extensions of credit
to investors holding 10% or more of the shares of the ETC and affiliates of the investor or
customer of the ETC. See 48 Fed. Reg. 3379 .(1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 211.33(b)(2)) (proposed Jan. 25, 1983).
Section 203 of ETCA also adds to the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(14)(B)(ii), which provides: "No provision of any other Federal law in effect on
October 1, 1982, relating specifically to collateral requirements shall apply with respect to
any such extension of credit [by a BHC to the ETC in which it invests]." The Conference
Report states that this language was intended to exempt bank-affiliated ETCs from existing
collateral requirements on the grounds that the other restrictions imposed by ETCA with
respect to the amount of investment by BHCs in ETCs and the restrictions on extensions of
credit would adequately protect affiliated banks from excessive risks. The Conference Report
further stated that "the exemption from the collateral requirement of existing law is necessary
in view of the type of assets most ETCs would have," i.e., inventory and receivables. 128
CONG. REc. H8348 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982).
Eight days after the enactment of ETCA, President Reagan signed the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which altered the collateral requirements for
transactions between banks and their affiliates under § 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12
U.S.C. § 371(c). Unaer this act, a loan or extension of credit to a bank's affiliate secured by
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In addition to direct investment by BHCs, Edge Act corpora-
tions and agreement corporations which are subsidiaries of BHCs
also may invest in ETCs. These equity investments are limited in the
aggregate to no more than 5 percent of the Edge Act or agreement
corporation's consolidated capital and surplus, or 25 percent in the
case of a corporation not engaged in banking. 79 In addition to these
entities, the term "bank holding company" is defined to include
bankers' banks, or banks owned and organized primarily to do busi-
ness with other banks and not to serve the general public.80
Export trading companies in which banking institutions may in-
vest are defined somewhat more narrowly for purposes of Title II
than for other portions of-the act. Title II defines "export trading
company" as being
a company which does business under the laws of the United States
or any State, which is exclusively, engaged in activities related to
international trade, and which is organized and operated princi-
pally for purposes of exporting goods or services produced in the
United States or for purposes of facilitating the exportation of
goods or services produced in the United States by unaffiliated per-
sons by providing one or more export trade services.8'
certain debt instruments including receivables would be required to be collateralized to the
extent of 120% of the amount of the credit extended. Since this change in collateral require-
ments was imposed in an unrelated piece of legislation passed almost simultaneously with
ETCA, it can be argued, based on the above-cited statements in the ETCA Conference Re-
port, that it was not intended to apply, even though the 120% collateral requirement was, in
fact, not "in effect on October 1, 1982" as provided by ETCA. However, the Federal Reserve
Board has contended that since the 120% collateral requirement was imposed subsequent to
ETCA it should apply. The Board is expected to receive considerable comment on this point
during the comment period on its proposed regulations. See DAILY REPORT FOR EXECU-
TIvEs (BNA) No. 8, at A-9, A-10 (Jan. 12, 1983).
Some persons believe that the collateral requirement will deter many smaller banks,
which may need to borrow from money center banks in order to collateralize an ETC, from
investing in a trading company. Accordingly, there has been recent pressure for Congress to
delete this collateral requirement. See DAILY REPORT FOR ExEcuTIvEs (BNA) No. 5, at C-1
(Jan. 7, 1983). See also Search and Destroy.: An In-Depth Look at the Trading Company Legislation,
American Banker, Feb. 17, 1983, at 18. The proposed Federal Reserve regulations, however,
retain the requirement that loans to ETCs affiliated with BHCs comply with the § 23A collat-
eral provisions. See Federal Reserve Board press release, Jan. 25, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 3377
(1983) (supplementary information to regulation to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211).
79 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 203(3), 96 Stat. 1233, 1236-38 (1982) (adding 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(14)(E)).
80 Id. (adding 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14)(F)(iii)). Small banks form bankers' banks to offer
a variety of services they could not independently offer. Inclusion of bankers! banks in § 203
presumably was intended to encourage such banks to participate in ETCs.
81 Id. (adding 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14)(F)(i)). The elaborate definition of "export trading
company" and the list of services to be provided by such entities was a deliberate attempt by
Congress to limit the activities and potential risk exposure of ETCs by having bank holding
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For purposes of this definition, the "export trade services" in which
an ETC can engage are defined to include, but are not limited to,
consulting, international market research, advertising, marketing, in-
surance (limited to insurance of risks resident or located outside the
United States or insurance covering the transportation of cargo from
any point in the United States to a destination outside the country),
product research and design, legal assistance, and transportation (in-
cluding trade documentation, freight forwarding, communication
and processing of foreign orders, warehousing, foreign exchange,
financing, and taking title to goods), provided that such services are
offered "in order to facilitate the export of goods or services produced
in the United States." 82
ETCA expressly prohibits a bank-related ETC from engaging in
agricultural production or manufacturing, except for incidental
product modification such as repackaging, reassembling, or ex-
tracting byproducts as is necessary to conform the goods or services
to the requirements of the foreign destination and to facilitate their
company ownership. The definition of ETCs in Title II applies only to export trading com-
panies in which banking organizations participate pursuant to that title. Export companies
not having bank participation are not so restricted, and, in fact, the term "export trading
company" is not used in Title III, which sets forth the Commerce Department's certificate of
review process. That process is available to any "person," whether or not such person quali-
fies as an "export trading company" under Title II.
Bank-related ETCs formed under Title II must be "exclusively engaged in activities re-
lated to international trade" and organized and operated "principally" to engage in export
trade. The House version of ETCA would have required that such companies be organized
and operated "exclusively" for the purpose of export trade. Substitution of the requirement
that ETCs be "principally" operated for export activities was accepted by the House-Senate
Conference Committee with the understanding that bank-related ETCs would be able to
engage to some extent in importing, barter, third-party trade, and related activities. The act
does not specify the degree that such non-export activity will be permitted, but the conferees
made clear that the Federal Reserve Board will be expected to exercise oversight in this area,
stating that
[i]t is the intent of the managers that the regulatory authority, in addition to facili-
tating bank-related investments in ETCs, examine, supervise, and regulate ETCs in
such a way as to assure that bank-affiliated ETCs operate in a manner consistent
with the Congressional intent: that ETCs promote, increase, and maximize U.S.
exports.
128 CONG. REc. H8347 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982).
The Federal Reserve Board's proposed regulations issued January 25, 1983 would define
"Export Trading Company" as a company "exclusively" engaged in international trade ac-
tivities and which "derives more than one-half its annual revenues from the export of, or from
facilitating the export of, goods and.services produced in the United States by persons other
than" that company or its subsidiaries. 48 Fed. Reg. 3378, 3379 (1983) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 211.32(a)) (proposed Jan. 25, 1983).
82 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 203, 96 Stat. 1233, 1236-38 (1982) (adding 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(14)(F)(ii)).
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sale at such destination. In addition, bank-related ETCs may engage
in or hold an interest in companies engaged in the business of under-
writing, selling, or distributing securities only to the extent that the
BHC investing in the ETC may do so under applicable federal and
state banking regulations.8 3 The Federal Reserve Board has express
authority to require a BHC to terminate its investment in an ETC or
impose other conditions if the Board determines that the ETC has
taken positions in commodities, commodity futures, securities, or for-
eign exchange "other than as may be necessary in the course of the
export trading company's business operations. '84
In addition, the new legislation authorizes and directs the Ex-
port-Import Bank to provide guarantees for loans extended by
financial institutions to ETCs and other exporters when these loans
are secured by export accounts receivable or inventories of exporta-
ble goods and when, in the judgment of the Export-Import Bank's
Board of Directors, inadequate financing is available in the private
credit markets and such guarantees will facilitate exports which
would otherwise not occur.85
Finally, ETCA liberalizes the present limits on the use of bank-
ers' acceptances to permit greater use of such instruments in connec-
tion with import and export transactions.8 6
III. Certification Procedures Under The Export Trading
Company Act
Companies, individuals, or banks desiring the benefits of the Ex-
port Trading Company Act of 1982 may seek certificates of review
for their contemplated export trade activities. The act will create a
special bureau in the Commerce Department whose sole purpose will
be to promote ETC formation. Additionally, the Commerce Depart-
ment will create a computerized clearinghouse called the "ETC Con-
tact Facilitation Service" to match prospective export trading
83 Id. (adding 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14)(C)). See Search and Destroy: An In-Depth Look at the
Trading Company Legislation, American Banker, Feb. 17, 1983, at 18.
84 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 203, 96 Stat. 1233, 1236-38 (1982) (adding 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(14)(D)).
85 Id. § 206, 96 Stat. at 1239.
86 Id. § 207, 96 Stat. at 1239-40. This section amends § 13 of the Federal Reserve Act, 12
U.S.C. § 372, to permit member banks and foreign bank branches subject to Federal Reserve
Bank reserve requirements to accept bankers' acceptances in an amount up to 150% of the
bank's paid up and unimpiired capital stock and surplus or, subject to Federal Reserve ap-
proval, up to 200% of such capital and surplus. Acceptances growing out of domestic transac-
tions are limited to 50% of the aggregate of all acceptances.
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companies with U.S. firms seeking export servicesY.7  More than
forty-five International Trade Administration District Offices are
designated to assist in this process. The government has also taken
the unusual step of directly promoting ETC formation by sponsoring
a series of conferences in twenty-seven cities nationwide to explain
how companies and individuals can establish ETCs.
A. Commerce Department Certification
The act vests jurisdiction for granting certificates of review prin-
cipally in the Commerce Department. Applicants can likely expect
substantial Justice Department participation in the process as well,
including the potential for an effective right of veto.
1. The Value of a Certificate of Review
Under Title III, qualified applicants may seek export trade cer-
tificates of review for specified conduct limited to export trade. Any
"person" -not necessarily an ETC as defined in Title II-may seek
export certification. "Person" has been interpreted to include an in-
dividual who is a U.S. resident, a partnership, a state or local govern-
ment entity, or a corporation.8
Being certified to export goods or services has several advan-
tages. First, as will be explained in more detail below, the certificate
87 Details concerning the ETC Contact Facilitation Service and the registration proce-
dures appeared in a Federal Register Notice, 47 Fed. Reg. 57,311 (Dec. 23, 1982). The Notice
explained that ETCs could "utilize this program in order to identify possible clients for their
service." Contact Facilitation would proceed by a registration process for which a $25.00 fee
is charged. Once 200 applicants have joined the program, the relevant company information,
including the details about what products are to be exported or represented, will be entered
into a computer data base in Washington, D.C. For an additional fee ($25.00 plus $5.00 for
each name provided), a subscribing party can search for matching companies or products.
The search will be conducted based on the kind of service provided, the geographic area, the
areas of foreign market interest, and the Standard Industrial Classification codes for each
product.
88 State governments may be interested in creating a state agency to stimulate export
trade. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has established a World Trade
Department to do just that. It hopes to stimulate exports in certain targeted areas such as
processed foods, home furnishings and apparel, fur garments, wood furniture, instrumenta-
tion, measuring equipment, and specialty paper. SPECIAL REPORT, ETCs COMING INTO
THEIR OWN, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS REvIEw, INTERNATIONAL DIVISION, CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (1982).
ETCs can, of course, have different structures depending on the type of export activities
contemplated. Aside from a state-sponsored ETC, there can be regional ETCs, general
ETCs, and ETCs oriented towards certain products, foreign areas, projects, or industries. To
the extent that a bank is involved in an ETC pursuant to Title II, the ETC's scope of opera-
tions and structure may need to be adjusted since bank-related ETCs are precluded from
engaging in manufacturing and are in other ways limited under Title II.
[April 1983]
EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT
recipient will in effect be immunized from antitrust liability for those
activities covered by the certificate. Section 306 codifies the protec-
tions conferred by a certificate of review and states that no civil or
criminal antitrust action may be brought against a certificate holder
for conduct "which is specified in, and complies with the terms" of a
validly issued certificate which was in effect when the allegedly im-
proper conduct occurred.8 9 Additionally, any person claiming injury
because of conduct engaged in pursuant to a certificate of review
may seek injunctive relief and damages. Section 306 limits the recov-
ery to actual damages and reasonable attorneys' fees. This limitation
on damages, when compared with the exposure to treble damages
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, could be a major incentive for
establishing an export trading company.
2. Obtaining a Certificate of Review
Under Title III, the Secretary of Commerce is entitled to "issue
certificates of review and advise and assist any person with respect to
applying for certificates of review." 9° Individuals or companies seek-
ing certificates must file written applications with the Commerce De-
partment, which will ultimately establish a special office for handling
the certificate process. Although the Commerce Department's final
regulations will provide more precise guidelines as to the level of de-
tail required in an application,91 the act broadly requires an appli-
cant to specify conduct limited to export trade. Additionally, the
information must pertain "to the overall market in which the appli-
cant operates" and must satisfy the applicable rules and
regulations. 92
On December 21, 1982, the Commerce Department's Interna-
tional Trade Administration, after consulting the Justice Depart-
ment, issued proposed rules concerning export trade certificates of
review. 93 The proposed rules require considerable detail about an
applicant's present and contemplated business activities. It is en-
tirely likely that smaller companies or individuals will consider the
89 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 306(a), 96 Stat. 1233, 1243 (1982) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 4016).
90 Id. § 301, 96 Stat. at 1240 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4012).
91 The Act requires the Secretary of Commerce, "with the concurrence of the Attorney
General," to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the act. Id. § 310,
96 Stat. at 1245.
92 Id. § 302(a)(2), 96 Stat. at 1240.
93 47 Fed. Reg. 56,972 (1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325) (proposed Dec. 21,
1982).
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level of required detail too burdensome, whereas larger companies
(which may be nonetheless more willing to forego certification and
rely on Title IV's general provisions) may find the reporting no
greater an inconvenience than complying with the standard pre-
merger notification requirements.
The proposed rules call for nineteen different kinds of informa-
tion. While some of these items are noncontroversial, such as an ap-
plicant's name and address, controlling entities, relevant corporate
legal documents, an annual report, and an organizational chart or
table depicting the applicant's export-related operations, a number
of the requirements call for details that to some may be overly bur-
densome. Among the requested information are the following items:
(1) a description showing the "customary industry product or serv-
ice definitions" of the goods or services to be exported, including
where "reasonably ascertainable" the Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation number to a seven-digit level, or the most detailed level
available;
(2) for each class of goods or service the principal geographic
area(s) in the United States where sales are made and, for the last
two calendar years, the dollar value of total domestic sales and total
foreign sales, including sales for all controlled entities;
(3) information concerning the total value of sales in the United
States for the last two years of the goods, wares, merchandise, or
services to be exported;
(4) a description of the specific export trade activities and methods
of operation which the applicant seeks to have certified, such as
types of services, the manner for establishing the prices and quanti-
ties of the exported goods and services, any exclusive selling ar-
rangements or pooling of resources or territorial or price
maintenance restrictions, and the nature of any restrictions for
withdrawal by members;
(5) a statement concerning whether there will be any direct or indi-
rect agreement or information exchange concerning domestic
prices, production or sales, or the exchange of other business confi-
dential information; and
(6) a statement concerning the foreseeability of any exported goods
or services reentering the United States in original or modified
form. 9 4
An applicant must also provide whatever other information the Sec-
retary may deem necessary.
The proposed regulations permit the applicant to draft the pro-
posed Federal Register notice. Allowing the applicant to draft the
notice will probably reduce the likelihood that a prospective appli-
94 Id at 56,974-75 (1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.3(b)).
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cant might choose to forego the certification process for fear that too
much information may alert his competitors (who themselves may
forego the certification process) to a new export opportunity. Denial
of a certificate of review will not be held against an applicant or used
"in evidence in any administrative or judicial proceeding in support
of any claim under the antitrust laws."'95 However, a denial on the
merits means that without the Secretary's approval, an applicant will
not be entitled to resubmit the application for certification within the
twelve-month period following the denial.96 Information submitted
to both the Commerce and Justice Departments in the application
process will be treated as confidential, and an unsuccessful applicant
may request that the application and all accompanying documenta-
tion be returned within thirty days of an adverse determination. 97
Applicants may well perceive these reporting requirements to be
burdensome, and thus be discouraged from using the certification
process. While the overall regulatory burden and structure is fairly
minimal, the applicant's disclosure obligation appears to be substan-
tial. As an alternative, the Commerce Department could have re-
quired fewer details at the outset and have requested more
information as needed to explain more elaborately the applicant's
export activities, market performance and shares, or industry agree-
ments. Instead, the Commerce Department chose to request all such
information from all applicants at the outset. The effectiveness of
this approach remains to be seen. Several individuals or companies,
whose export consciousness has now been raised, may well nonethe-
less forego certification, relying instead on the guarantees provided
under Title IV. Whether relying on Title IV guarantees is riskier
than seeking certification will depend on the company, the export
activity, and the perceived risk of treble damages.
Since export trading companies may also engage in importing
activities, an additional uncertainty arises as to the information that
must be disclosed to obtain a certificate of review. The required in-
formation relates to "the overall market in which the applicant oper-
ates." It can be questioned whether "overall market" encompasses
importing as well as exporting activities and whether a certificate
holder's reduced antitrust exposure also extends to importing activi-
ties which arguably violate applicable antitrust laws. The written
application, however, is to specify "conduct limited to export trade."
95 Id at 56,977 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.12).
96 Id at 56,975 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.4(e)).
97 Id at 56,977 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 325.11, .14).
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Although a certified export trading company may also engage in im-
porting activities, the accompanying regulations should address the
question whether the certificate protections extend to import
transactions.
Once an application has been received and "deemed submitted"
by the Department of Commerce, the Secretary must publish a no-
tice in the Federal Register within ten days after the application has
been submitted.98 An application will be "deemed submitted" once
the Secretary of Commerce has determined whether it "is complete,
[and] has been properly prepared." 99 A defective application may be
resubmitted once the deficiencies have been corrected. The Federal
Register notice must identify each person submitting the application
and describe the conduct involved in the application. 00 The pro-
posed regulations provide that the applicant may submit "[a] pro-
posed non-confidential summary of the conduct for which
certification is sought for publication in the Federal Register pursu-
ant to section 325.5(a)." 101 This information must be submitted to
the Attorney General not later than seven days after submission of
the application to the Department of Commerce. The Secretary
must also transmit "any other relevant information," including infor-
mation concerning "the market share of the applicant in the line of
commerce to which the conduct specified in the application
relates."' 0 2
98 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 302(b)(1), 96 Stat. 1233, 1240 (1982) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 4012).
99 47 Fed. Reg. 56,975 (1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.3(d)) (proposed Dec. 21,
1982).
100 Id at 56,975-76 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.5).
101 Id at 56,975 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.3(b)(15)). The applicant must also
submit a draft proposed certificate for the export conduct which it seeks to have certified. Id
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.3(b)(16)).
102 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 302(b)(2)(c), 96 Stat. 1233, 1241 (1982) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 4012). A practical problem could arise for a bank-related export trading company
that engages in both import and export activities. For example, in periods when the value of
the U.S. dollar is high, exports may be discouraged, and a bank-related export trading com-
pany that was initially "organized and operated principally" to export goods or services may,
through no fault of its own, suddenly find its import activities exceeding its export activities in
terms of dollar volume and profit. It is, therefore, unclear whether such a situation, lasting
for a brief or even for a more prolonged period of time, would somehow call into question the
entity's status as a valid export trading company. At the same time, the entity could point
out, if so challenged, that such business uncertainties did not undermine the fact that it was
still "organized and operated principally" for exporting. The outcome in such circumstances
may well turn on the nature of the entity's activities as characterized in its written application
and the certificate of review.
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The Secretary of Commerce is required to issue a certificate if an
applicant has established that its export trade activities will
(1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or re-
straint of trade within the United States nor a substantial restraint
of the export trade of any competitor of the applicant;
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within
the United States of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services of
the class exported by the applicant;
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against competi-
tors engaged in the export of goods, wares, merchandise, or services
of the class exported by the applicant; and
(4) not include any act that may reasonably be expected to result
in the sale for consumption or resale within the United States of the
goods, wares, merchandise, or services exported by the applicant. 103
While the first standard appears generally consistent with existing
antitrust case law, further elaboration and interpretation will cer-
tainly be required as ETCA is applied in the future.'0 4 The second
standard marks a significant deviation from the traditionalperse rule
against price-fixing. Under the "reasonableness" standard, exporters
would seemingly be immune from antitrust liability for the activity
covered by the certificate of review as long as the domestic effects of
its enhancing, stabilizing, or depressing of prices were not "unreason-
able." The last two standards constitute important new criteria.
The third standard provides a wholly new cause of action available
against certificate holders. Similarly, the fourth standard conceiva-
bly could create substantial difficulties for manufacturing companies
which have offshore assemblies and which are also involved in the
sale or resale of certain finished products in the United States. The
proposed regulations offer no new guidance on these standards but
simply restate them in full.
The standards to be applied by the Justice Department will be
particularly important, especially in light of the concurrent jurisdic-
tion which the act provides for each department. While the Com-
merce Department has principal authority for issuing certificates of
review, it lacks the Justice Department's international antitrust expe-
rience. The Justice Department will clearly exercise a de facto veto
power in the certification process. For the certification process to
work smoothly, the two departments will have to coordinate their
103 Id § 303(a).
104 The Conference Committee's Report notes that "[t]he Conferees intend that the stan-
dards set forth in this subsection encompass the full range of the antitrust laws." 128 CONG.
REC. H8348 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982).
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involvement. It therefore would seem preferable for the Commerce
Department to administer the act's procedural provisions, while leav-
ing issues of substantive antitrust compliance for the Justice
Department. 105
Application of section 303(a)'s four-part criteria will not be a
simple process. Questions of statutory and case law interpretation as
well as international comity may well determine the outcome in par.
ticular factual situations.10 6 Accordingly, counsel advising a client
interested in establishing an export trading company should care-
fully understand the ramifications of these antitrust considerations
prior to filing an application for a certificate of review, since the full
range of antitrust standards that would otherwise be applicable to
the proposed conduct is incorporated in the act's certification
standards.
Once an application has been filed, the Commerce Department
has ninety days within which to determine whether to issue a certifi-
cate of review.10 7 If issued, the certificate must also have the Attor-
ney General's concurrence and shall specify the export trade, export
trade activities, and methods of operation employed by the applicant
trading company. 108 Additionally, the certificate of review must
specify the person to whom the certificate has been issued as well as
any terms and conditions deemed necessary by either department to
assure compliance with section 303(a). Denial of an application must
be accompanied by an explanation from the Secretary, t0 9 and an ap-
plicant may request a reconsideration, regardless of whether the de-
nial was in whole or in part, within thirty days after receiving an
105 This possible division of labor was recognized by Senator Heinz in the 1981 Hearings.
1981 Hearings, supra note 3, at 45.
106 The issues to be considered in resolving such questions may be particularly complex.
In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976),
the court formulated the following jurisdictional test for applying the Sherman Act abroad:
Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign commerce
of the United States? Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a
violation of the Sherman Act? As a matter of international comity and fairness,
should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to cover it?
Id at 615. Questions such as these could easily complicate or even delay the certification
process while the Commerce and Justice Departments resolve whatever conflicting interpreta-
tions might arise.
107 47 Fed. Reg. 56,975 (1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.4(a)) (proposed Dec. 21,
1982). Where an applicant needs an expedited determination, the act so provides, but with a
proviso that no certificate of review may be issued within thirty days of publishing the Fed-
eral Register notice. Id at 56,976 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.7).
108 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 303(b), 96 Stat. 1233, 1241 (1982) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 4013).
109 Id § 303(d)(1).
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adverse notification." 10
Once issued, a certificate remains valid for the activities de-
scribed therein, and the application need not be renewed unless addi-
tional export activities not described in the certificate are
contemplated. The act further specifies, however, that "[a] certifi-
cate shall be void ab initio with respect to any export trade, export
trade activities, or methods of operation, for which a certificate was
procured by fraud."'' A certificate holder is also obligated to in-
form the Secretary of Commerce of "any change relevant to matters
specified in the certificate."'"1 2 Should an export trading company
intend to engage in conduct not specified in its certificate, it must file
an application to amend its certificate. This amendment will be
treated as a de novo application for a certificate." 3 The Commerce
Department may revoke a certificate if a certificate holder fails to
supply information demanded by the Secretary of Commerce based
upon a belief that the certificate holder no longer complies with sec-
tion 303(a)'s standards."14 The Secretary may revoke or modify the
certificate as necessary so that it will then apply only to the export
trade, export trade activities, or methods of operation that comply
with section 303(a)'s criteria. Both the Attorney General and the As-
sistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division may in-
vestigate an export trading company's activities under section 3 of
the Antitrust Civil Procedures Act, with one important difference:
no civil investigative demand may be issued against a person who is a
target of such investigation." 5 Actions taken by the Secretary of
Commerce are reviewable in any appropriate U.S. district court as
long as the action is filed within thirty days of the administrative
ruling. 116
Although proposed regulations have now been issued, the scope
of certificates of review remains unclear. For example, will a certifi-
cate of review be obtainable for relatively broadly described activities
or will certificates be necessary on a case-by-case basis? It is doubtful
that Congress had contemplated the latter situation, since case-by-
case adjudications would be time-consuming and would quite likely
discourage use of the certification process altogether.
110 Id § 303(d)(2).
111 Id §303(o, 96 Stat. at 1242.




116 Id § 305, 96 Stat. at 1243 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4015).
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Title III provides antitrust immunity for conduct covered by
terms of the particular certificate. As explained above, one of the
principal benefits from obtaining a certificate of review is that a cer-
tificate holder is exempt from treble damages liability for conduct
falling within the certificate's terms; treble damages may still be
awarded, however, for conduct not covered by the certificate if it
constitutes an antitrust violation.1 7 At this time, however, it is by no
means clear just how far this limited immunity will be extended. Ad-
ditionally, ETCA and the Conference Report seem to conflict on
whether otherwise ultra vires conduct' 8 falling outside the certificate's
scope is subject to both civil and criminal penalties. According to
section 306(a) of ETCA, "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b), no
criminal or civil action may be brought under the antitrust laws"
against a certificate holder for conduct that is properly covered by an
effective certificate. Yet, section 306(b)(1) specifically provides that
any person injured because of conduct pursuant to a certificate of
review may bring a civil action for "injunctive relief, actual damages,
the loss of interest on actual damages, and the cost of suit" for result-
ing injury. An anomaly is therefore presented because civil or crimi-
nal actions may only be commenced pursuant to section 306(b)(1),
but that section provides only for civil lawsuits. It remains unclear
whether a criminal action may be maintained under section 306
against a certificate holder despite the fact that the Conference Com-
mittee Report states that ultra vires conduct "would remain fully sub-
ject to criminal sanctions as well as both private and governmental
civil enforcement suits under the antitrust laws."" 9 This confusion is
probably the result of a drafting mistake which can easily be cor-
rected by a technical amendment to the legislation.
Lawsuits brought pursuant to Title III must be filed "within two
years of the date the plaintiff has notice of the failure to comply"
with section 303(a)'s standards "but in any event within four years
after the cause of action accrues."' 20 ETCA creates a presumption
that conduct which is specified in and complies with an issued certifi-
cate also complies with section 303(a)'s four standards. When cou-
pled with the provision allowing only for single rather than treble
117 Id § 306(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4016).
118 The Conference Committee's Report states that "[c]onduct which falls outside the
scope of, or violates the terms of, the certificate is ultra vires and would not be protected." 128
CONG. REC. H8349 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982).
119 Id
120 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 306(b)(2), 96 Stat. 1233, 1246 (1982) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 4016).
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damages, this placing of the burden of proof on the plaintiff will sub-
stantially reduce the likelihood that frivolous or "strike" suits will be
filed in expectation of a large recovery or a generous settlement to
avoid litigation expenses. Defendants who prevail in any action
brought under section 306(b) (1) are also entitled to the costs incurred
in defending against the claim, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
This latter provision is a significant departure from traditional U.S.
practice and will probably discourage plaintiffs from filing frivolous
lawsuits.
Title III also provides that the Secretary of Commerce and the
Attorney General may issue guidelines to promote greater certainty
in the application of the antitrust laws to export trade. 12' These
guidelines would describe particular kinds of conduct that would sat-
isfy the criteria for determinations under sections 303 and 304. The
Secretary of Commerce may also require each certificate holder to
submit an annual report on its export trading activities.' 22
In addition to the standard certification procedures described
above, the proposed Commerce Department regulations permit cer-
tificate applications to be amended, 23 and provide for expedited cer-
tification where there is a "special need."'' 24 Certificates may also be
reconsidered,' 25 modified,' 26 or revoked.' 27 An applicant may seek
judicial review in the appropriate U.S. district court of an adverse
determination under sections 325.4, 325.6, and 325.9 of the regula-
tions within thirty days of the determination. 28
It should be stressed that Title III is intended as an alternative
to relying on Title IV's antitrust provisions.' 29 For reasons which
will be considered below, an individual or company may choose to
121 Id § 307, 96 Stat. at 1244 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4017).
122 Id § 308 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4018). The Commerce Department intends to
issue a regulation requiring such annual reporting.
123 47 Fed. Reg. 56,976 (1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.6) (proposed Dec. 21,
1982).
124 Id (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.7).
125 Id (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.8).
126 Id at 56,976-77 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.9).
127 Id
128 Id at 56,977 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.10).
129 For a discussion ofTitle IV's amendment of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976),
see notes 130-53 infra and accompanying text. Seegeneraly PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE
EXPORT TRADING COMPANY AcT 57-101 (H.N. Schiffman & W. Weber eds. 1983). A good
discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of Title III and Title IV from the
antitrust perspective is found in an interview with Carl A. Cira, Jr., formerly Assistant Chief,
Foreign Commerce Section, of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, who was
personally involved in the legislative process that led to ETCA's passage, in A Lawyer wnswers
Questions on the Antitrust Provisions, American Banker, Feb. 17, 1982, at 20.
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forego the certification process and rely instead on its appraisal that
its export activities satisfy the standard codified in section 401.
Counsel should be aware, however, that a decision to forego certifica-
tion would deprive an exporter of the greater certainty provided by a
certificate of review, and could well mean that liability for unlawful
activities would result in exposure to treble damages. On the other
hand, there are certain conceivable drawbacks in relying on the certi-
fication process. First, an ETC would remain liable for behavior not
covered by its certificate of review which nonetheless violated the an-
titrust laws. In fact, by seeking certification, an applicant may well
be exposing itself to even more scrutiny than if it simply relied on
Title IV. Second, Title III creates what amounts to a new, private
cause of action for "unfair methods of competition against competi-
tors engaged in the export of goods, wares, merchandise, or services."
Presumably this cause of action would be based on export activity
which violates the scope of the certificate of review, since one can
conclude that conduct covered by the certificate would not be action-
able. In light of these considerations, the decision to rely on Title IV
or to seek a certificate of review will depend on a number of factors,
such as the size of the business and the contemplated export
activities.
IV. Clarified Antitrust Immunity
Title IV modifies the Sherman Act by adding a new section, 15
U.S.C. § 7, providing that antitrust proscriptions will not apply to
export trading activities unless the conduct has a
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect . . . on trade
or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations;
or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
• . . on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations; of a
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States
130
Thus, Title IV means that foreign companies will lack a federal
cause of action against American companies in U.S. courts if an ex-
port trading company's business activities cannot be shown to have a
"direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on American
markets. Enactment of ETCA does not replace or modify the Webb-
Pomerene Act. However, the Webb-Pomerene Act is probably now
outmoded since the protection it offers is automatically provided by
130 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, 96 Stat. 1233, 1246 (1982) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7).
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the new section 7 of the Sherman Act. Presently existing Webb-
Pomerene Act companies are not required by ETCA to change in
any way their present status. In fact, such companies may well want
to avoid scrutiny and not apply for a certificate of review.
The Conference Committee's Report contains very little discus-
sion concerning the impact of Title IV. Nonetheless, it is clear that
the "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" language
is intended to codify the prevailing common law, which, as noted
above,' 3 ' is apparently evolving jurisdictionally on the basis of the
"reasonableness" principle. As Atwood and Brewster have
commented,
An American's conduct in trade among or within foreign nations is
not of antitrust concern under United States law, unless it is found
to have prohibited consequences for competition in United States
export, import, or domestic markets. The Sherman Act is con-
cerned with freedom of American foreign commerce, not with the
competitive conduct of Americans abroad solely because they are
Americans. 132
Under the qualified immunity afforded by the Webb-Pomerene
Act, 33 however, this "narrow and carefully limited exception"' 34
from antitrust liability was not considered to provide the protection
that some businessmen felt was necessary in order to undertake coop-
erative export ventures.' 3 5 Although some members of the U.S. anti-
trust bar have been quick to suggest that individuals or companies
desiring to use the new certification procedures will rely on Title IV's
relaxed antitrust standard rather than employ Title III's registration
approach, 3 6 it is by no means clear whether the anticipated regula-
tory costs of obtaining certification and the reluctance to disclose
business plans to the Commerce Department and through the Fed-
eral Register will deter exporters from seeking certification. For
many exporters, the certainty of the government's blessing plus the
absence of treble damages exposure for certain kinds of activities may
well offset whatever "costs" are associated with certification.
Application of the common law's "direct, substantial and rea-
131 See note 41 supra.
132 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 15, § 7.02, at 183-84. See also United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945); ANTITRUST GUIDE,
supra note 20, at 7.
133 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
134 Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 n.12 (1978).
135 1981 Hearings, supra note 3, at 297 (testimony of Howard W. Fogt, Jr.).
136 See Moore, Late Addition May Prove To Be K9 To Export Act, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 11,
1982, at 1.
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sonably foreseeable" effects test, however, will not necessarily be a
simple or certain process. Both courts and commentators have re-
cently challenged the scope of the so-called "effects" test.137 In its
first formulation by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America (Alcoa),'3 8 the test focused principally on the place
where particular conduct had its ejects rather than where the con-
duct itself occurred. Yet, simply showing that conduct abroad had
an effect on U.S. commerce would not settle all the questions that
could conceivably arise under the antitrust laws. As Judge Hand ob-
served in Alcoa, "[a]lmost any limitation of the supply of goods in
Europe, for example, or in South America, may have repercussions in
the United States if there is trade between the two."'1 39 Alcoa's "ef-
fects" test focused, in part, on whether the activity involved was in-
tended to affect U.S. commerce and whether such an effect
occurred. 140 Based on Alcoa and its progeny, the Justice Depart-
ment's 1977 Antitrust Guide for International Operations stated that U.S.
antitrust standards would apply to foreign export activities in cases
where "there is a substantial and foreseeable effect on the United
States commerce."''4 The Guide went on to add that "foreign activi-
ties which have no direct or intended effect on United States consum-
ers or export opportunities" were not subject to U.S. antitrust
laws. 142
Recent U.S. case law has been less than consistent in its discus-
sion of the "effects" test, and several decisions appear to have formu-
lated tests which may vary substantially as to the relevant factors
considered in applying the test. For example, in Todhunter-Mitchell &
Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., the test was whether the activity "directly
affect[s] the flow of commerce into or out of" the United States.143
The court in Waldbaum v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., phrased the rele-
vant inquiry as whether the activity created any "anticompetitive
effects" in the United States.144 "[I]mpact upon United States com-
merce" was the necessary showing according to the district court in
Industria Siciliana Asfaltt, Bitumi, Sp.A. v. Exxon Research & Engineering
137 See note 41 supra.
138 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
139 Id at 443.
140 Id at 443-44.
141 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 20, at 6.
142 Id at 7.
143 383 F. Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
144 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,378, at 76,257 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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Co. 145 An even more confusing standard was adopted in Dominicus
Americana Bohio v. Gu/f & Western Industries, Inc., where the court held
that "it is probably not necessary for the effect on foreign commerce
to be both substantial and direct as long as it is not de minimis."'' 46
Other cases, such as Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T &
SA. ,147 and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. ,48 have held that
in applying the Sherman Act to foreign conduct, several "balancing
factors," including fairness and comity, should be assessed in deter-
mining whether jurisdiction is proper. Whether these formulations,.
particularly the Dominicus de minimis standard, amount to the same
test as a "substantial effects" test is doubtful.
Title IV's purpose was to create a uniform standard applicable
to export transactions which, by eliminating some of the confusion
and uncertainty of recent case law, would provide more concrete gui-
dance to counsel and their clients. Accordingly, Title IV requires
that the export activities shall be exempt from antitrust liability un-
less there is "a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect"
on U.S. commerce. Addition of the "reasonableness" standard is a
crucial change which "connotes not only objectivity, but practicality
as well. The test is whether the effects would have been evident to a
reasonable person making practical business judgments, not whether
actual knowledge or intent can be shown."'149
From one perspective, virtually any activity among exporters
acting pursuant to ETCA will have some effect on U.S. commerce.
Title IV now qualifies the jurisdictional factors by requiring direct-
ness, substantiality, and reasonableness. Nonetheless, there will still
be situations that will not be readily resolved even under this new
standard. For instance, what should be the result if members of an
export trading company experience increased exports whereas other
companies that are not permitted (for whatever reason, including
their own choice) to join a particular export trading company experi-
ence reduced business activity? Does the outcome turn on whether
there is an overall net increase in U.S. export activity for the given
business? Would the activities of a vertically integrated export trad-
ing company survive an antitrust challenge under Title IV which if
conducted by its wholly domestic counterparts would violate U.S.
145 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,256, at 70,784 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
146 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
147 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976).
148 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
149 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON H.R. 5235, FOREIGN TRADE ANTI-
TRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1982, H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982).
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antitrust laws? As Atwood and Brewster have observed, "if the joint
effort serves to benefit some American exporters but operates to the
competitive detriment of others, an antitrust objection may exist."'1 50
Future interpretations of Title IV will have to deal with these issues.
Questions such as these will undoubtedly have to await future
interpretation by the administrative agencies and the courts, and will
also largely depend on the facts of the given situation. Thus, where
small- or medium-sized firms combine to designate one export selling
agent abroad, the lawfulness of the behavior will depend on factors
such as the firms' U.S. market share and the relative presence of en-
try barriers. The greater the market power and the higher the entry
barriers, the more cause for concern, especially if the joint activity
were seen as possibly fostering price fixing, market division, output
limitations, or anticompetitive activity in the United States. At issue
under section 7 will be the directness of these effects from the joint
activity as well as the substantiality of the impact. The appraisal of
whether the effect was direct or not will require assessment of foresee-
ability which, in turn, will involve factors such as market concentra-
tion and economic power. New section 7 makes clear that no
antitrust violation will be found if the export activity involves solely
foreign customers and foreign competitors absent the required effect
on U.S. domestic commerce, import trade, or the export trade of a
U.S. person. This result would overrule such cases as Waldbaum v.
Worldvision Enterprises, Inc. ,'51 and Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitum4
S.p.A. v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co. 152 Under these authorities,
virtually any effect on a U.S. firm from joint export activities would
have triggered antitrust liability; now, such an effect must be "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" within the requisite U.S.
target areas-U.S. domestic commerce, import trade, or the export
trade of a U.S. person.
Another uncertainty created by Title IV is the extent to which a
foreign entity might be able to rely on Title IV to challenge the im-
port activities of a U.S. importer. The foreign competitor could con-
ceivably challenge his U.S. competitor in U.S. courts, at least to the
extent that a U.S. importer's activities actually reduce competition
with its foreign competitors and limit the availability of a product or
service in the U.S. market. U.S. exporters relying on Title IV must
remain aware of the impact of foreign antitrust laws on their con-
150 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 15, § 9.08, at 287.
151 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
152 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,256 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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duct, since neither certification nor reliance on Title IV will insulate
an exporter from this liability. Because of the recent Pfizer bill, how-
ever, foreign governments suing under Title IV can no longer recover
treble damages but are limited to actual damages only. 153
ETCA's focus is to encourage U.S. exports and to raise the "ex-
port consciousness" of U.S. firms that previously have not exploited
their export potential. In one sense, this legislation suggests strongly
that the U.S. government and U.S. courts will tolerate some other-
wise anticompetitive business behavior in order to promote competi-
tive activity abroad. There is, however, no firm basis in the existing
case law for assuming that this outcome will be sustained. While
Title IV does not contemplate a substantive lessening of U.S. anti-
trust laws, it does overrule some district court rulings which would
have allowed antitrust jurisdiction to be founded on almost any ef-
fect whatsoever on a U.S. firm. This change is a significant one, and
adoption of the "reasonableness" standard is fully consistent with re-
cent case law developments attempting to limit or narrow the extra-
territorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws. Thus, where the "effect" on
the U.S. market is to expand market opportunities and benefit the
industry involved, such otherwise anticompetitive export activities
may be allowed under Title IV's more flexible standard.
V. Problems and Uncertainties Created by ETCA's Application
Despite ETCA's apparent simplicity, the new legislation none-
theless creates a number of significant problems and uncertainties.
Many of these uncertainties, such as the extent of Title IV's exemp-
tion from antitrust liability, will require judicial interpretation or
further refinement of the accompanying agency regulations. At least
seven significant problem areas can be identified: (1) the need to
clarify the relevant antitrust standards, (2) the potential for proce-
dural litigation through administrative challenges prior to granting a
certificate of review, (3) the scope of disclosure needed to obtain cer-
tification, (4) the scope of actual product certifications, (5) the un-
resolved jurisdictional questions involving the Commerce and Justice
Departments and the Federal Reserve Board, (6) the need to de-
velop workable, consistent guidelines in applying the legislation, and
(7) the meaning of Title III's provision allowing the Attorney Gen-
153 In Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), foreign nations were recog-
nized as "persons" entitled to recover treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act. On
December 29, 1982, President Reagan signed the Foreign Sovereign Antitrust Recoveries Act,
Pub. L. No. 97-393, limiting foreign governments to recovering actual damages.
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eral "to enjoin conduct threatening clear and irreparable harm to the
national interest."1 54
A. Clarifying the Antitrust Standards
To a certain extent, the future interpretation of ETCA's anti-
trust provisions-both the standards in Title III and the exemption
in Title IV-will depend on how the controversy over the "effects
test" and the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law
evolves. At the same time, ETCA may well generate considerable
challenges in the courts and before the agencies over questions such
as.what constitutes "a substantial lessening of competition or re-
straint of trade,' 155 or whether a given export activity will "unreasona-
bly enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within the United States ' 156
of the goods or services exported. If, in fact, ETCA stimulates U.S.
export activity, one can readily anticipate more intense litigation of
these antitrust issues.
B. The Procedural Litigation Potential
In addition to substantive litigation over the meaning of
ETCA's antitrust and competition provisions, additional litigation
involving the certification process itself will likely arise. The pro-
posed regulations say very little on this subject. Under section
325.5(b), "[i]nterested parties may, within twenty days from the date
of publication in the Federal Register, submit to the Secretary infor-
mation relevant to the determination of whether to issue a certifi-
cate. 1 57 Presumably, interested or affected parties such as an
applicant's competitors in the United States or, for that matter,
abroad, can oppose the granting of a certificate within this twenty-
day period. It would appear, however, that opposition at this stage is
limited to the filing of "comments" with the Commerce Department.
Although the proposed regulations governing judicial review allow
"[a]ny person aggrieved" by the Secretary's final orders to challenge
the action in U.S. district court, challenge may only be made once a
certificate of review has been granted.
Numerous other questions regarding challenges to certification
154 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 306(b)(5), 96 Stat. 1233, 1243 (1982) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 4016).
155 Id § 303(a)(1), 96 Stat. at 1241 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4013).
156 Id § 303(a)(2) (emphasis added).
157 47 Fed. Reg. 56,976 (1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.5(b)) (proposed Dec. 21,
1982).
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may arise. For example, is there an exhaustion requirement that an
"aggrieved party" have first filed opposing comments during the ad-
ministrative pre-certification stage? What happens to such court
challenges should an opposing or "aggrieved party" challenge certifi-
cation on the basis that the standards have not been satisfied? To
defend against such opposition, would a prospective applicant then
be obligated to reveal in discovery information submitted to the
Commerce and Justice Departments that would otherwise be nondis-
coverable under 15 C.F.R. § 325.14's confidentiality provisions?
Where the challenging litigant is, for example, a foreign entity such
as a government or corporate body, will the district court be permit-
ted to entertain notions of comity in assessing whether a given certifi-
cation was providently granted?
The prospect of litigation during the administrative pre-certifi-
cation stage or afterwards in U.S. district court will mean additional
costs to an applicant seeking a certificate of review. Reliance on Ti-
tle IV, in such circumstances, may seem less complicated because it
requires no Federal Register notification, thereby reducing the op-
portunity for an interested competitor to learn of a particular ex-
porter's proposed export activity. These uncertainties, which also
raise the legal costs of seeking certification, could act as a significant
deterrent to using Title III.
C. The Scope of Disclosure
ETCA's proposed regulations contemplate substantial disclosure
about an exporter's activities and market performance. Over time
these requirements may prove too burdensome, especially for the
company that is a novice to international trade. Should this be the
case, the Commerce Department may want to consider relaxing some
of the reporting requirements for smaller companies that are unlikely
to have any substantial anticompetitive domestic effects.
D. The Scope of Product Certifications
Some goods or services, or the manner in which they are sold,
may not be susceptible to the kind of precise definition called for
under the proposed regulations. In such circumstances, applicants
may attempt to rely on more generic descriptions that may or may
not satisfy the Commerce and Justice Departments. The views of the
two departments may not be readily reconcilable on this question.
The Commerce Department, on the one hand, may tolerate a more
generic statement as part of its basic posture to promote trade; the
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Justice Department, on the other hand, because of its preoccupation
with antitrust compliance, may be less willing to accept a more re-
laxed approach.
E. ConcurrentJurisdiction
The regulatory framework created by ETCA and the accompa-
nying proposed regulations provide for apparent principal jurisdic-
tion and administrative decisionmaking in the Commerce
Department with concurrent authority given to the Attorney Gen-
eral. Additionally, ETCA's banking provisions are to be supervised
by the Federal Reserve Board. There is no inherent reason why such
overlapping jurisdictions should prove administratively complex.
Yet, as noted above, there may arise occasions in which the Justice
and Commerce Departments differ in their interpretation of the rele-
vant standards and the proposed conduct. Caught in the middle, an
applicant could find certification in jeopardy.
F. The Need for Guidelines
Section 307(a) of ETCA states that the Secretary of Commerce,
with the Attorney General's concurrence, may issue guidelines "[t]o
promote greater certainty regarding the application of the antitrust
laws to export trade. 158 The contemplated guidelines are to de-
scribe "specific types of conduct" for which determinations as to cer-
tificates of review (including reporting requirements, amendment
and revocation of certificates) will be made. These guidelines may
also "summariz[e] the factual and legal bases in support of the
determinations."159
It is important at the outset that such guidelines be issued in
order to give potential certificate recipients a better idea of the crite-
ria to be used by the Commerce and Justice Departments in making
their determinations. Hypothetical cases can be discussed in a fash-
ion similar to the Justice Department's 1977 Antitrust Guide for Interna-
tional Operations or in Treasury regulations under the Internal
Revenue Code, and can be based on actual cases presented to the
agencies involved. Such guidelines might reduce the possibility for
conflict between the two departments. Guidelines discussing joint
export ventures and joint selling agencies would probably be the
158 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 307(a), 96 Stat. 1233, 1244 (1982) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 4017).
159 Id § 307(a)(2).
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most important, since the most significant antitrust problems are
likely to arise in these areas.
G. The Meaning of "Clear and Irreparable Harm to the National Interest"
Under section 306(b)(5), "[t]he Attorney General may file suit
pursuant to section 15 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 25) to enjoin
conduct threatening clear and irreparable harm to the national inter-
est."' 6° The legislative history does not explain what this provision
means, and it is interesting to note that the statute refers to "national
interest" rather than "national security interest." Guidance is needed
as to what kinds of conduct would warrant such intervention by the
Attorney General. For example, does section 306(b)(5) extend to ex-
ports of critical raw materials that may affect our defense prepared-
ness should they become in short supply, and would it also permit
Justice Department intervention in export matters affecting U.S. for-
eign policy? Did Congress intend the Attorney General to become
involved where certain export activities are adversely affecting some
of our allies? If so, does section 306(b)(5) contemplate involvement
by the Department of State in a fashion similar to that of the time
when U.S. courts would defer to an assertion of sovereign immunity
made by the Department of State on behalf of a foreign sovereign? 161
To the extent that section 306(b)(5) contemplates active inter-
vention by the U.S. government, foreign governments and businesses
should consider using such action in matters of importance to them.
They may well have an opportunity to influence such decisions by
filing comments in response to Federal Register notices describing
applications for certificates of review.
VI. Conclusion
At a time when the U.S. dollar is a relatively strong and perhaps
even overvalued currency, ETCA's critics may ask whether it makes
sense for the U.S. government to sponsor legislation promoting ex-
160 Id § 306(b)(5), 96 Stat. at 1243 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4016).
161 See Pugh & McLaughlin, Jurisdictional Immunities ofForeign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 25
(1966). This intervention practice ceased in 1952 with the famous "Tate letter" announcing
that the State Department would no longer assert sovereign immunity on behalf of friendly
sovereigns where the acts involved in the litigation concerned private or commercial activi-
ties. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Department of State Acting Legal Adviser, to Acting Attorney
General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Changed Poli Concerning the Granting of
Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984-85 (1952). One commentator
has recently suggested, however, that the Executive Branch at least consider a more active
intervention policy in some private antitrust suits. Cira, supra note 41, at 264.
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ports by American companies. The answer to that criticism is a sim-
ple one: with looming foreign trade deficits, a decision not to
encourage exports will only exacerbate an already imbalanced trade
position. Similarly, U.S. companies should be encouraged to adopt a
competitive posture stressing competition on the basis of quality
rather than mere price competitiveness. Over the long run, this atti-
tude can only benefit Americans in general and American producers
in particular.
The Export Trading Company Act of 1982 was intended as a
major step towards greater export competitiveness by U.S. compa-
nies. By encouraging exporters to form ETCs with the financial par-
ticipation of banking institutions, to seek the limited exemption from
antitrust liability available through the certificate of review process,
or to rely on the clarified antitrust provisions of a new section of the
Sherman Act, ETCA represents a bold and unusual step for Ameri-
can manufacturing, producing, and service-industry interests. What
is unclear, however, is whether all of these export incentives will be
buried under increasing federal regulation from the three federal
agencies-the Commerce and Justice Departments and the Federal
Reserve Board-having regulatory jurisdiction over ETCs. 162 The
proposed regulations already issued by these bodies appear to be at
best comprehensive and at worst potentially burdensome, especially
to those thousands of small- and medium-sized companies that are
the act's intended beneficiaries. If the final regulations have the ef-
fect of retarding ETC development, the result would be particularly
ironic in light of Title I's findings that export development in the
United States has been "hampered . . . by Government
regulations.' 63
The U.S. ETCs that do emerge because of this legislation will
probably not resemble closely the Japanese sogo shosha but, given the
162 One commentator who remained opposed to the certification procedure was skeptical
as to the ability of the Secretary of Commerce to make the necessary and correct antitrust
determinations:
Not only is [certification] cumbersome and complex, but it delegates to the Secre-
tary of Commerce great power to abrogate the antitrust laws insofar as exports are
concerned. It seems to me unwise to lodge such power in an authority having no
other responsibility for maintaining a coherent antitrust policy and lacking experi-
ence and expertise in this area.
International Application of US Antitrnst Laws.- Hearings on H.. 2326, HR. 1648, and HR. 2459,
Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciag, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (March 26, 1981) (statement of James A. Rahl).
163 Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 102(b), 96 Stat. 1233, 1234 (1982) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 4001).
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presence of the U.S. government as a regulator rather than as a full-
fledged promoter and the restrictions on the involvement of banking
institutions, will undoubtedly have a particularly American charac-
ter. Nevertheless, there exists considerable potential for companies
that previously have never exported to take advantage of ETCA's
new provisions. Whether a majority of such companies will prefer to
rely on Title IV's antitrust exemption or, instead, to pursue the cer-
tificate of review process cannot be determined at this early period.
Both approaches have benefits and burdens, and any company con-
sidering creating an ETC should fully understand the relevant anti-
trust and business factors, including the applicable domestic law of
the targeted export countries.
ETCA provides the prospective exporter with numerous options
which will entail careful business and legal planning before any ex-
porting activity begins. Experienced antitrust counsel should advise
on the potential antitrust liability and whether, given the contem-
plated ETC structure and activity, the company should seek certifi-
cation or instead rely on Title IV. An additional approach might
also involve invoking the Department of Justice's Business Review
Procedures.' 64 Counsel should also advise whether bank participa-
tion is feasible, whether qualifying as a Webb-Pomerene association
is worthwhile, and whether an established ETC should consider seek-
ing the favorable tax treatment available to domestic international
sales corporations.' 65
Whether the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 will gener-
ate the export activity contemplated will depend on numerous fac-
tors. The most significant aspect of this new legislation is the
apparent focus of the U.S. Congress on stimulating new export op-
portunities for American business. ETCA's overall effectiveness
should be evaluated periodically, and particular attention should be
devoted to considering whether the administrative regulations are
evolving in a fashion to satisfy the legislation's objectives. If they do
not, and U.S. companies fail to respond to ETCA's export incentives,
then perhaps the Congress and the administrative agencies should
164 On December 6, 1978, the Justice Department announced a policy to expedite busi-
ness review requests of export-related activities. This Business Review Procedure, codified at
28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1982), provided that businesses seeking review of their proposed export
activities by the Antitrust Division would receive answers within thirty days from the Divi-
sion's receipt of all relevant data about the proposed transaction. The purpose of the Business
Review Procedure was to allow a firm or organization to seek a statement as to whether the
Division would challenge the activity as violative of the federal antitrust laws.
165 I.R.C. §§ 991-999 (1976).
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consider other, perhaps more ambitious and far-reaching, attempts
to stimulate U.S. export activity.
